Al Abasey: Cakes Without Sugar: Reasons Behind Foreign Investor Reluctance t

CAKES WITHOUT SUGAR: REASONS BEHIND
FOREIGN INVESTOR RELUCTANCE TO ENTER
MESOPOTAMIA
Nidham G Al Abasey
CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 147

II.

ANALYSIS OF INHERENT LIMITATIONS ......................... 150

A. Political Conflict and Security Collapse ............................ 151
B.

Spread of Corruption .......................................................... 156

C. Diminished Infrastructure Capacity ................................... 161

III.

DETERMINANTS OF LEGAL FRAMEWORK ..................... 163

A. Inadequate Protection and Enforcement ofIntellectual
Property Rights .................................................................. 163
B.

Unclear Iraqi Laws for Ratification ofInternational
Arbitration Awards ............................................................. 166

C. Institutional Capabilities ofIraqi Judiciary ....................... 169

IV.

PILLARS OF THE INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT
SUFFER SUBSTANTIAL CRACKS ....................................... 171

A. Imbalance in Investment Commissions .............................. 171
B.

Bureaucracy in Land Allocation/or Investment Projects .. 176

C. Financial Markets .............................................................. 178

V.

DEMONSTRATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS: IRAQ
RANKING IN INTERNATIONAL INDICATORS OF THE
INVESTMENT CLIMATE ....................................................... 179

A. Index of Economic Freedom ............................................... 180
B.

Ease ofDoing Business Index ............................................ 180

t Ph.D Candidate, School of Law, Bangor University; Former Head of the Legal
Consultants Office at Al-Qadisiyah University, Iraq. Prior to the doctoral study, the author
was an Assistant Professor at the Law School of Al-Qadisiyah University, Iraq. The author
would like to thank Prof. Dermot Cahill, Prof. Suzannah Linton and Prof. Haider Hamoudi
for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. He is also grateful to Dr. Wei
Shi for his insightful comments on early versions of this article. All errors and omissions
remain mine.

Published by SURFACE, 2013

1

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 5

Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com.

146

[Vol. 41: 1

C. Country Risk Rating ........................................................... 181

1. International Country Risk Guide ................................. 181
2. Euromoney Country Risk .............................................. 182
3. Institutional Investor Index ........................................... 182
4. Dun & Bradstreet Index ................................................ 182
5. Coface Index ................................................................. 183
D. Transparency Index ............................................................ 183
E.

Governance Indicator ......................................................... 184
1. Regulatory Quality Index .............................................. 184
2. Government Effectiveness Index ................................... 184
3. Index ofPolitical Stability and Absence of Violence .... 185
4. Rule ofLaw Index ......................................................... 185

VI.

ROADMAP: RECOMMENDATIONS THAT SHOULD BE
ADOPTED ................................................................................ 186

A. Address Inherent Determinants .......................................... 186
1. Constitutional Revision ................................................. 186
2. Strengthening Anti-Terrorism Efforts ........................... 188
3. Combating Terrorism Financing .................................. 189
a. Fighting Terrorism According to the Rule ofLaw .. 189
b. Cooperating Widely in Counter-Terrorism
Efforts ........................................................................... 189
4. Combating Corruption Flu ........................................... 189
a. Strengthening Anti-Corruption Institutions ............ 190
b. Improving Accountability ....................................... 190
c. Complying With International Commitments ......... 191
5. Rehabilitation ofInfrastructure .................................... 192
B. Reform of the Legal Framework ........................................ 193
1. Activation ofProtection ofIntellectual Property .......... 193
2. Enforcement ofInternational Arbitration Awards ........ 193
3. Promote Judiciary Independence and Capabilities ...... 194

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/5

2

2013]

Al Abasey: Cakes Without Sugar: Reasons Behind Foreign Investor Reluctance t

Cakes Without Sugar

147

a. Boosting Judicial Independence ............................. 194
b. Upgrading Judicial Capacities ............................... 194
c. Enhancing Judicial Security ................................... 195
C. Reorganization of the Investment Framework ................... 195
1. Activating the Role ofInvestment Commissions ........... 195
2. Removal ofBureaucratic Obstacles ............................. 196
3. Developing the Iraqi Financial Market ........................ 196
VII.

CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 197
I.

INTRODUCTION

Iraq was hopeful when it imagined preparing itself as an
"investment cake" under the new Investment Law.
Following
1
investment environment reforms, Iraq opened the doors of its economy
to foreign investors. 2 However, as some foreign investors flowed in and
commenced "eating" the cake, they were disappointed to find it sugarfree, not sweet and sugary as most would prefer. 3 What then would be
1. See SAMI SHUBBER, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT IN IRAQ 5-6 (2009).
2. Iraq has made significant progress in the reconstruction of its economy, and
investors have shown considerable interest in the country, as evidenced by the influx of
Chinese investors in the past few years. In fact, recent statistics show that the number of
foreign investments doubled in 2010, as investors swarmed into the Middle Eastern country
to cash in on investment opportunities arising from Iraq's stabilitiy. More positive results
are being reported by western news agencies, as evidenced by Newsweek International's
(London) following assertion: "Civil war or not, Iraq has an economy, and- mother of all
surprises- it's doing remarkably well. Real estate is booming. Construction, retail and
wholesale trade sectors are healthy, too, report by Global Insight in London. The U.S.
Chamber of Commerce reports 34,000 registered companies in Iraq, up from 8,000 three
years ago. Sales of second-hand cars, televisions and mobile phones have all risen sharply.
Estimates vary, but one from Global Insight puts GDP growth at 17 percent last year and
projects 13 percent for 2006. The World Bank has it lower: at 4 percent this year. But, given
all the attention paid to deteriorating security, the startling fact is that, Iraq is growing at
all." See generally WORLD BANK, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION, REBUILDING
IRAQ: ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSITION (2006).
3. Considering the investment needs in Iraq, investment opportunities are myriad
across sectors in the Iraqi economy. In this respect, the Iraqi Government has availed
investment opportunities across sectors including construction, industry, agriculture,
tourism, housing, communications, and health care. Leading investment companies still
have a tendency to invest in the energy sector, particularly as proven by the fact that Iraqi
reserves of oil stand at 115 billion barrels. On the basis of these figures, Iraq ranks 2- 3
worldwide with the largest proven amount of reserves. There are also indications that Iraq
has 45- 100 billion additional barrels in its western desert, which remain undiscovered.
Furthermore, Iraq's discovered oil reserves amount to 10% of the world's total reserves.
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the result?
Certainly, other investors would receive a "warning" notice that
the Iraqi "cake" was not only free of sugar, but also salty. The following
question would be raised here regarding the multi-white-powder cakes
in a warehouse: which of them has sugar?
The thesis of this article is that ten years of Iraqi and international
efforts 4 to encourage foreign investment have failed and that foreign
investment in Iraq remains limited to the extent of foreign investment
flows amounting to USD 1. 617 billion, as of 2011. 5
The path to investing in Iraq is still full of obstacles because
reforms have not been addressed. For example, a number of old laws do
not meet minimum international standards, yet they remain in force.
Moreover, national infrastructure is not up to acceptable standards, and
foreign investors must comply with administrative red tape. Despite
other recently emerging challenges, as described by this article's
analysis below, 6 some writers argue that there are sufficient existing
justifications for foreign investors to come to Iraq and initiate a
harvesting of dividends. 7
Iraq has natural gas ("NG") reserves as well. Available information indicates 112 trillion
cubic feet NG reserves in Iraq, thus placing Iraq at the tenth position worldwide in terms of
largest NG reserves. Potentially, additional NG reserves amount to 275- 300 trillion cubic
feet along with large amounts of other metals including phosphate, sulphur, and iron. See
Top Ten Reason to Invest in Iraq, REPUBLIC OF IRAQ NATIONAL INVESTMENT COMMISSION,
available at http://investpromo.gov.iq/why-iraq/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
4. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SUPPORTING
INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ 8 (2010). The Iraqi Government is
at the forefront in spearheading reconstruction efforts in Iraq, but support is being provided
by other investment partners such as the U.S. through the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
which is also channeling funds toward improving reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Id.
5. UNCTAD, WORLDINVESTMENTREPORTUNITEDNATIONS 171 (2012).
6. See generally Clarence M. Dass, Adventure Capitalizing in Baghdad: An
Entrepreneurial Approach to Reconstructing Iraq, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 157
(2010); Ned Parker, The Iraq We Left Behind: Welcome to the World's Next Failed State, 91
FOREIGN AFF. 94 (2012); Antony Blinken, Is Iraq on Track? Democracy and Disorder in
Baghdad, 91 FOREIGN AFF. 152 (2012); Christopher J. Coyne & Adam Pellillo, Economic
Reconstruction Amidst Conflict: Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq, 22 DEF. & PEACE
ECON. 627 (2011); CHRISTOPHER J. COYNE, The Economic Reconstruction of Iraq (2010),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1550867 (last visited Oct.
30, 2013).
7. David Grantham argues that the calculation of profits outweigh risks for foreign
investment companies in Iraq. See David Brent Grantham, Calculated Risk: The Advance of
IOCs and NOCs Into the Iraqi Investment Theater, 3 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & Bus. 315
(2010) [hereinafter Grantham, Calculated Risk]; See generally Judith Richards Hope &
Edward N. Griffin, The New Iraq: Revising Iraq 's Commercial Law is a Necessity for
Foreign Direct Investment and the Reconstruction of Iraq's Decimated Economy, 11
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These opinions rely on a drastic change in the country's political,
legal, and economic arenas, with new facts being formulated after the
Anglo-American troops toppled the then-ruling Baathist Regime.
Thereafter, the new Iraqi Government sought to rebuild the country's
war-tom economy by opening its doors to investors. Iraq has moved
from a central to an open-market economy. To enable this shift, a
number of laws were enacted; 8 Investment Law No. 13 of 2006 is the
most notable of these new laws. The law provides for guarantees
together with prohibition of nationalization and confiscation, adoption
of stable legislation, and provision of international arbitration as
mechanisms of dispute settlement. A host of incentives and exemptions
have been provided for by this law, the most important of which is the
ten year tax free period for investments. 9
The reconstruction efforts are one reason why international
investors are storming into Iraq. It is estimated that Iraq's reconstruction
efforts are going to cost about USD 100 billion. 10 International
companies are coming into Iraq to acquire a share of the finances.
Another reason for such a notion is the amount of support Iraq is
receiving from international organizations and governments. Since
2003, Iraq has been a recipient of aid both in technical and legislative
know-how from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Political developments in the country are seen
as remarkable progress in that MENA-OECD deemed it necessary to
help hold competitive elections as part of the democratic transition.
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 875 (2004); Robert D. Tadlock, Occupation Law and Foreign
Investment in Iraq: How an Outdated Doctrine has Become an Obstacle to Occupied
Populations, 39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 227 (2005). The title of David Grantham's previous article
was Caveat Investor: Assessing the Risks and Rewards of IOCs Entry into Iraq, which won
the Spring 2009 AIPN Student Writing Competition. See David Brent Grantham, Caveat
Investor: Assessing the Risks and Rewards of IOCs Entry Into Iraq, 3 J. WORLD ENERGY L.
& Bus. 304 (2010).
8. One of these was the "Foreign Investment Order." This legislation, which was part
of the 100 orders issued by the former U.S. civilian administrator Paul Bremer when he was
head of the Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA") during the first year of occupation, has
provided U.S. groups with a multitude of benefits: full repatriation of profits earned in Iraq
by foreign companies, sale of all Iraqi companies to foreign groups including banks,
privatization of the entire Iraqi public sector, total legal immunity for occupants and their
subcontractors in Iraq, and "national treatment" of foreign investments. See Order No. 39
Foreign Investment, THE IRAQ COALITION (Dec. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031220_ CP AORD_ 39_Foreign_Investment_. pd
f (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
9. See SHUBBER, supra note 1, at 5.
10. James Glanz & T. Christian Miller, Official History Spotlights Iraq Rebuilding
Blunders, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at Al.
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However, Iraq's political and economic environments are still seen as
challenges for its government, and will need to be dealt with in the
years ahead. At the international conference concerning developments
in Iraq, the representatives of the International Compact with Iraq (ICI)
recognized the importance of reforms that are required to be supported
by the MENA-OECD: noting that refors should center on governance
and investment for development. Structural reforms such as promoting
sector development, attracting foreign investment, and good governance
were presented at this gathering. According to the representatives, all
these aspects affect a country's business environment. 11
The author argues that such a reform is a white point on a grey
board, but is still insufficient for the revival of the investment
environment. Unfortunately, the Iraqi investment environment has been
shaken to the roots by political rifts at the borders, where the volcano of
terrorism has erupted. The consequent corruption has taken its toll.
Furthermore, the weak investment-related legal system can be ascribed
to a lack of effective protection of intellectual property rights, the
indefinite role of national investment authorities, and the extreme
ineffectiveness (even lack) of an independent and efficient judiciary.
This article concludes that there are certain reforms that may
alleviate these obstacles and establish a sustainable investment-friendly
environment so that Iraq may move forward.
The rest of this article consists of five parts: the first part analyzes
the endemic obstacles in the country; the second part tests the efficiency
of the Iraqi legal system; the third part reveals that the country's
investment frameworks are inhibitory; the fourth part demonstrates that
legal determinants still exist in the investment environment; the fifth
part presents a roadmap for the reform of the investment environment in
Iraq.
II.

ANALYSIS OF INHERENT LIMITATIONS

Even though Iraq is a country rich in investment opportunities,
investors have expressed concerns over the feasibility of investing
money in Iraq and obtaining negative returns. The causes of investors'
fears include political conflicts, insecurity, corruption, and poor
infrastructure.

11. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4,
at 14, 34.
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A. Political Conflict and Security Collapse
On December 19, 2011, Iraqis woke to receive the news that Vice
President, Tareq al-Hashemi, had been arrested on charges of running a
terrorist group. 12 This story caused further damage to the deteriorating
political, legal, and security situation in the country, sending a bleak
message to potential investors. 13 Upon analysis, it was determined that
the worst part of the situation was that it reflected a negative political
environment. If the charges against the Iraqi Vice-President, who was
accused of harboring terrorists, were proven in the absence of any fierce
political competition, this would be a clear indication that terrorists held
a strong foothold in the Iraqi Government. However, if the charges were
proven false, the case would reflect the exclusion mechanism adopted
by politicians on one hand, and the lack of independence of
investigative authorities and the judiciary represented by the court that
sentenced Al-Hashemi to death on the other. 14 This led to massive
political and legal issues. The asylum sought by Al-Hashemi in
Kurdistan and his stay therein under the protection of the Kurdistan
forces despite the arrest warrant against him was followed by the
reluctance of the Kurdistan Police to enforce the Baghdad court arrest
orders; the role of the Kurdistan Police in denying the Federal Police
admittance into Iraqi Kurdistan to enforce the arrest warrant is also
significant. 15 Such developments resulted in a big question over the
administrative and legal powers of the Kurdistan region, leaving the
Iraqi Constitution in a dilemma regarding the regulation and
administrative organization of the state. 16 This scene is but a reflection
12. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, REPORT No. 126, DEJA vu ALL OVER AGAIN?
IRAQ'S
ESCALATING
POLITICAL
CRISIS
(2012),
available
at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Afiica/Iraq%20Syr
ia%20Lebanon/Iraq/126-deja-vu-all-over-again-iraqs-escalating-political-crisis.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 5, 2013).
13. See Blinken, supra note 6 at 155
14. On September 9, 2012, the Iraqi Central Criminal Court sentenced Vice President
Tareq al-Hashemi to death after he was convicted on charges of managing terrorist death
squads. See The Judicial Authority, TRANSLITERATED ARABIC TITLE [JUDGMENT TO DEATH
BY SUPREME JUDICIAL COUNCIL] (2012), available at http://www.iraqja.iq/view.1677 I (last
visited Nov. 5, 2013); Michael A. Newton, The Death Penalty and the Iraqi Transition:
Observations on a Lost Opportunity (Vanderbilt Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Paper
Series,
Paper
No.
12-45,
2010),
available
at
Research
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191144## (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
15. See Iraq VP Tariq al-Hashemi Sentenced to Death, BBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2012),
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19537301 (last visited Nov. 5,
2013).
16. Most of the political and administrative problems are due to the failing constitution
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of a failed state, where the absence of law and infesting corruption and
brutality are the rule. Political leaders use security forces and militias to
suppress enemies and intimidate the public with an inclination to settle
scores with opponents by means of timed bombs and silencer guns on
streets. 17 There are large-scale accusations against the government and
ruling parties of protecting and harboring criminals and corrupt
individuals on one hand and liquidating supervisory and judicial bodies
that hinder illegal activities on the other. 18 Clearly, the Iraqi
Government has proven itself unable to provide basic services such as
electricity, clean water, and appropriate healthcare to the public.
Unemployment among youths amounts to 30%; thus, they are easy prey
for terrorist groups. 19 Consequently, Iraq does not exhibit the stability
sought by foreign companies which has a negative impact on its efforts
to attract investors. 20
The post-2003 political conflicts in Iraq resulted in a fragile
security environment; 1 however, such fragility has existed in Iraq over
the last four decades owing to wars fought by Iraq and its consequent
political seclusion, as manifested by the investor repellent siege.
However, the governments in existence during those times endeavored
to enact pro-investment laws to attract investors into Iraq. This effort
failed because of the then unstable political and security situations, and
the presence of a pessimistic outlook. 22 This led to the failure of
in terms of the sought-after crystal clear administrative federal or decentralized
organization. The ambiguous constitutional provisions regarding the regulation of powers
between the central and province governments on one hand, and the overlap of powers on
the other, contributed to creating one of the most complex problems that resulted in the
conflict between the Central Government, Kurdistan Region and the Region-free
Governorates. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Notes in Defense of the Iraq Consitution, 33 U. PA.
J. INT'L L. 1277 (2012); Christina J. Sheetz & Matthew T. Simpson, Symposium: Rethinking
the Future: The Next Five Years in Iraq, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. Rev. 181 (2009).
17. See Parker, supra note 6.
18. See Blinken, supra note 6, at 152-53.
19. See Parker, supra note 6, at 94
20. See Dass, supra note 6, at 157, 161-62.
21. See James P . Pfiffner, U.S. Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the
Army, 25 INTELLIGENCE & NAT'L SECURITY 76, 76-85 (2010). The dissolution of the Iraqi
army and security departments by the former Civil Administrator of Iraq, Paul Bremer, and
his substitution with militias of the ruling parties contributed to the insecurity. This led to
large-scale corruption in granting military positions to persons who lacked basic police or
military training. The political rampage has been further compounded by sacking thousands
of civil servants who once were members of the banned Baath Party. For the same political
reasons (i.e., membership of the Baath Party), some opponents were banned from having a
say in the political process. Id.
22. See Dass, supra note 6, at 159-60.
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attracting in-bound investments and out-bound departure of local
capital. 23 By 2005, the political situation improved following the
adoption of the new constitution and the completion of the first free
elections, thus marking a better political situation and a future
democratic outlook. Another positive point was the significantly
improving security situation. 24
Contrary to expectations, the political and security situation in Iraq
only worsened, with serious setbacks taking place to initiate an
unending series of daily terrorist acts since mid-2006. As for investors,
deliberate assassinations, kidnappings, bombings, and threats against
individuals and corporations alike have created an enormous obstacle to
in-bound investments. Political instability and insecurity are the main
reasons behind foreign companies and local capital leaving Iraq. 25
In 2009, under a political truce, the number of terrorist attacks
reduced owing to hunting down of armed militias under the "law
enforcement" operation. Following the formation of the national
partnership government, which involved parties from across the Iraqi
political spectrum, the investment environment improved slightly, with
numerous Turkish, Chinese, and Iranian companies engaging in
business activities of various natures, particularly in the housing
industry. 26
Despite the aforementioned progress, the Iraqi investment
environment remained incapable of attracting and retaining major
foreign companies. At the time, foreign investors were uncertain about
the long term stability of Iraq's investment climate. 27 Fleeing from
investments in Iraq is justifiable; the political congestion between
Baghdad and Irbil has generated problems that have reflected on the
operations of oil companies. 28 Relations between investment-hosting
and parent states have gained importance in Iraq's case, as the strained
Baghdad-Ankara29 political relations have had a toll on Turkish
23. See generally Stephen Biddle, Michael E. O'Hanlon & Kenneth M. Pollack, How
to Leave a Stable Iraq, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 40, 52-53 (2008).
24. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4,
at 14.
25. See Dass, supra note 6, at 161-62.
26. See WORLD BANK, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION, supra note 2, at 27,
44.
27. See Grantham, Calculated Risk, supra note 7, at 315, 319-20.
28. See REX J. ZEDALIS, THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF OIL AND NATURAL GAS IN IRAQ:
CURRENT REALITY AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 317, 319 (2009).
29. Baghdad- Ankara relations are experiencing tension because of a number of
differences; recently, Turkey refused to extradite the fugitive Iraqi Vice-President Al-
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companies' Iraq-based operations. 30 The security of Turkish investors is
related to Iraq's inter-country political disputes.
Broadly speaking, the partial stability of given areas in an
investment region does not lead to astonishing results. Although the
southern and northern parts of Iraq enjoy reasonable security, the
creation of a healthy and attractive environment requires more stability
across Iraq. 31 Foreign direct investments are long-term by nature, and
hence, investors are interested in the political and security situation
across the whole of a country, rather than just parts of it. 32 Therefore,
insecurity is a hindrance to foreign private investment as it results in
higher security and protection costs for investments, and transport. A
number of opinions stress that such investment companies sometimes
use security or military companies to overcome the insecurity
dilemma. 33 Moreover, some sectors such as the oil sector will be a target
for foreign companies for two reasons: (1) the global strategic
importance of this sector, which promotes the protection of such
companies, and (2) the high returns that motivate a high-risk approach. 34
Hashemi in addition to accusations brought by Al-Maliki's government against Erdogan of
dealing with Kurdistan as an independent state last August, following the Turkish Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's visit to Kirkuk without notifying the Federal Government,
which irked the latter. Earlier, Erdogan accused his Iraqi counterpart of power monopoly. In
response, Al-Makili accused Turkey of causing chaos in the region by meddling in the
internal affairs of neighboring countries, including Iraq and Syria. See Iraq Warns Turkey
over Kurdistan Pipeline Deal, BBC NEWS (May 22, 2012), available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18163248 (last visited Nov. 6, 2013).
30. Hundreds of Iraqi demonstrators burnt the Turkish flag and threatened Turkish
interests in Iraq on the backdrop of Turkey's interference with Iraqi affairs and violation of
Iraqi sovereignty. Turkey, Iraq Condemn "Shameful Behavior" Against Flag in Basra
Protest, TODAYS ZAMAN (May 20, 2012), available at http://www.todayszaman.com/news280891-turkey-iraq-condemn-shameful-behavior-against-tlag-in-basra-protest.html
(last
visited Nov. 6, 2013).
31. Dass, supra note 6, at 157.
32. SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW RECONCILING POLICY AND
PRINCIPLE 16 (2008).
33. Alberto Abadie & Javier Gardeazabal, Terrorism and the World Economy, 52 EUR.
ECON. REV. 1 (2008).
34. This can be seen in Colombia, where foreign companies were reluctant to enter the
Colombian market. Opposition groups used to blow up the pipelines of foreign oil
companies, but the latter managed to wipe out such opposition groups by offering huge
financial support to the Colombian Government with a view to securing their interests. The
same holds true for the companies that operated in Afghanistan before toppling, as they
concluded many agreements with the Government since 1996. These foreign companies
offered large amounts to the Taliban Government. When Unocal was told that Taliban is a
regressive terrorist movement, UNOCAL spokesman Mike Thatcher said, "We're an oil and
gas company. We go where the oil and gas is." This makes sense because large companies
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Iraq is going through difficult times, mainly because of sectarian
and racial divisions that have never been as deeply felt or expressed as
they are now. 35 The country's foreseeable future holds no indication of
the settlement of rampant disputes that have taken place between
warring parties since the last parliamentary elections. 36All political
efforts did not lead to any solution; the appointment of the two ministers
of defense and interior is far from settled, 37 the council of strategic
policies has never come to light, and the dispute between Baghdad and
Irbil about Kirkuk and other disputed regions remains intact. 38
Moreover, acting on the Oil and Gas Law is still of no interest to
politicians. Meanwhile, the Federal Government and Government of
Kurdistan are still at war regarding the endorsement of oil agreements
with several oil companies created without the federal government's
review or consent. The Constitution39 remains as it is despite its
ambiguities. No census has been executed. There are a large number of
political blocs, especially those represented in the House of
Representatives, on top of conflicts that affected the overall situation of
the State.
In a serious evaluation of political and sectarian conflicts,
grassroots uprising in Iraqi cities, particularly Ramadi and Salahuddin,

use specialist security companies for protection. This applies to the Iraqi economy, where
oil resources are outside city boundaries, thus making protection and capital retention easy.
See Wayne Madsen, Afghanistan, the Taliban and the Bush Oil Team, GLOBAL RESEARCH
(Jan. 23, 2002), available at http://globalresearch.ca/articles/MAD201A.html (last visited
Nov. 6, 2013).
35. One of the reasons behind sectarian volatilization has been the Iraq-based U.S.
Forces; the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds deal with the U.S. forces differently. The first fought
U.S. Forces, while the second cooperated with them to establish the foundations of the
nascent state, but for U.S. Forces exiting Iraq afterwards. However, the Sunnis felt insecure
about U.S. Forces leaving the country. See Bart S. Fisher, Symposium: Markets in

Transition: Reconstruction and Development: Part One - Reconstruction: Prescriptions for
Iraq, Predictions for Russia and Performance for China: Investing in Iraq: Legal and
Political Aspects, l8TRANSNAT'LL. 71 (2005).
36. Strong suspicions exist between political blocs which stubbornly fight and
exchange accusations of power monopolies or attempted dictatorships. See IMTIAZ HUSSAIN,
AFGHNISTAN, IRAQ AND POST-CONFLICT GOVERNNANCE: DAMOCLIAN DEMOCRACY? 5 (David
Sciulli ed., Brill Academic Publishers, 2010).
37. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 12; Parker, supra note 6.
38. SONER CAGAPTAY ET AL., THE FUTURE OF THE IRAQI KURDS 15 (Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 85, 2008), available at
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus85 v2. pdf
(last
visited Oct. 29, 2013).
39. An undertaking given to the Sunni movements in return for their political
involvement. See Parker, supra note 6, at 108.
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started with a wave of raids and arrests based on terrorism charges
against the bodyguards of the Minister of Finance, Rafe al-Eissawi, a
40
member of the Iraqya political bloc and an iconic Sunni figure.
However, the uprising gave way to larger-scale demands, most
importantly the angry demand for the freedom of female detainees in
Iraqi prisons. Protestors accuse security forces of arresting women to
force their wanted husbands and sons to tum themselves in, 41 and call
for releasing those detainees already proven innocent by court orders,
but never set free as well as others who were arrested upon informant
reports while being denied the right to legal investigation. 2
Regarding protesters, it is important to mention that the way the
state is addressing the dilemma of terrorism is clearly politicized and
sectarian. This has caused protesters to call for abolishment of the AntiTerrorism Law owing to the notion that it is designed to target Sunni
Arabs. Moreover, protesters call for the Accountability and Justice Law,
which has replaced the De-Baathification Law, to be rescinded and for a
43
newly enacted amnesty law for all detainees to be put into force.
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki' s response to protesters has
consisted of a mixture of warnings and approbation. He has expressed
his willingness to set up a fact-finding committee to investigate the
cases of detainees and penitentiaries while accusing some demonstrators
of making up a sectarian crisis and being involved in a clamor that will
end with a partitioned Iraq. 44
Considering the latest developments in Iraq, the door is wide open
for partitioning, with the ill omens of civil war looming ahead.
B. Spread of Corruption
Globally, the previously quoted indices indicate that corruption has
reached serious proportions and threatens the development and
investment programs just as it distorts the economic decision-making
process and drains the economy. 45 This reduces the quality and volume
40. Duraid Adnan, Arrest of a Sunni Minister 's Bodyguards Prompts Protests in Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 21, 2012) at A9.
41. Rami Ruhayem, Protests Engulf West Iraq as Anbar Rises Against Maliki, BBC
NEWS (Jan. 2, 2013), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20887739
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
42. See Parker, supra note 6, at 102-203.
43. Ruhayem, supra note 41.
44. Id.
45. David Ng, The Impact of Corruption on Financial Markets, 32,10 MANAGERIAL
FIN. 822-36 (2006).
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of foreign and local investments. 46
Despite the fact that most countries in the world contain a certain
degree of corruption, corruption has never prevented foreign investors
from investing in these countries. However, the case is different with
the 169th country of 175 listed that was awarded 18 points by
Transparency International (TI) in 2012. 47 The worst part about this is
the suspicions regarding the reconstruction efforts undertaken after
2003 among supporters and donors. 48 Corruption is a serious problem,
especially in Iraq; Iraq is a country rich in natural resources where the
rule of law has been weakened by consecutive wars and dictatorships.
Therefore, Iraq is the victim of instability and punitive supervisory
procedures. Furthermore, since the discovery of oil to the present date,
Iraq has lost opportunities of economic recovery derived from large oil
revenues. Corruption, as witnessed currently, is starting to nurture
terrorism and deepen sectarian divisions. The failure of rehabilitating
state institutions hinders the development of investment and business
environments. 49
Since 2004, there has been a constant series of corruption charges
within the UN Oil-for-Food Program. 50 The scandal emerged after an
Iraqi newspaper published a list of 270 persons that included UN
officials, politicians, and company owners who made use of illegal oil
transactions as part of the program. Thereafter, the U.S. Congress
discovered that Saddam Hussein had accumulated a staggering amount
of USD 17.3 billion from such transactions, of which USD 13.6 billion
were with neighboring countries. 51
46. Id.
47. Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, available at
http://transparency.org/cpi2012/%20results (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
48. M. CherifBassiouni, Postconjlcit Justice in Iraq, 33 HUM. RTs. 15 (2006).
49. See Charles Tiefer, The Iraq Debacle: The Rise and Fall of Procurement-Aided
Unilateralism as a Paradigm of Foreign War, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2008); Ryan J. Liebl,
Rule of Law in Postwar Iraq: From Saddam Hussein to the American Soldiers Involved in
the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal, What Law Governs Whose Actions?, 28 HAMLINE L. Rev.
91 (2005).
50. The Oil-for-Food Program was designed in 1996 at a cost of USD 60 billion to
enable Iraq to buy food, medicine, and other necessary supplies using oil revenues. Back
then, oil volumes had an impenetrable ceiling against the UN-imposed blockade on Iraq
after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The program came to an end because of the invasion of
Iraq in 2003 and the toppling of Saddam Hussein. See Joy Gordon, When Unilateralism is
Invisible: A Different Perspective on the Oil-for-Food Scandal, 13 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 59
(2007).
51. Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme,
Report on the Management of the Oil-for-Food Programme, Volume II- Report on
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The UN received backlash for being the entity responsible for the
program. 52 This led the UN to set up a three-member independent
committee, presided over by Folker, for investigating the charges. The
investigations resulted in corruption charges against officials,
companies, 53 and organizations. 54 The program damaged the reputation
and credibility of the UN, and was described as the largest financial
scandal in history. 55 Astonishingly, Iraqi brokers accused of suspicious
dealings have emerged once again to contribute to the reconstruction
stage in Iraq. 56
With the arrival of U.S. Forces in Iraq, reconstruction finances
started to flow into the war-tom country. 57 What happened to such
finances? Washington provided a total of USD 60 billion to
reconstruction efforts and USD 146 billion in the Iraqi currency. 58
However, Iraqi citizens have not benefited considerably from these
funds. How then was the money spent? Recently, the Iraqi Ministry of
Electricity failed to satisfying the needs of the electricity despite ''the
true price of Iraq's power crisis is not just the $40bn it costs the Iraqi
economy annually, but also the growing frustration of the Iraqi populace
that suffers with only four-five hours of electricity each day." 59 Portable
Investigation (Sept. 7, 2005).
52. Id. at 3.
53. A key figure of the scandal was Benon Sevan, the former director of the program,
who pleaded not guilty to all bribery or complicity charges leveled against him. Kojo, the
son of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, has been proven to have received payments from
Cotecna, another suspicious person. See id. at 71-72.
54. Investigations included French company Total, as well as international companies
from the Middle East and Russia, in addition to security companies. See id. at 29-30.
55. The wider scale of this scandal was all about the future of the UN, with the socalled Neo-conservatives in the United States adding fuel to the fire as an indication of the
UN' s incompetence. Senator Norm Coleman, head of the Congressional Investigation
Committee, called for Annan's resignation. See Nile Gardiner, The White House Should
Call on Kofi Annan to Resign, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Dec. 15, 2004), available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/12/the-white-house-shou ld-call-on-kofiannan-to-resign (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
56. Gordon, supra note 50. The provisional Iraqi Government conducted routine
investigations in 2005 but never came up with a decision. Id.
57. David Caron, The Reconstruction of Iraq: Dealing with Debt, 11 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT'L L. & PoL'Y 123, 126 (2005).
58. See STUART w. BOWEN, A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
at
available
(2013),
9
vii,
RECONSTRUCTION,
IRAQI
FOR
http://www.sigir.mil/learningfromiraq/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
59. See Shamsek Asad, Hussain Qaragholi & John Sachs, Iraq 's Power Crisis and the
Need to Re-engage the Private Sector - Smartly, THE MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC SURVEY
(Feb. 6, 2012), available at http://www.mees.com/en/articles/3923-iraq-s-power-crisis-and-
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water supplies are cut off every other day. Conditions in the country are
as poor as those in the "pre-Saddam" era and are worsening because of
the terrorist attacks, which have claimed the lives of tens of thousands
since 2003. 60
Considering this situation, TI warned that reconstruction efforts
may well tum into the largest corruption scandal in history 61 and stated
that management of oil revenues must be more transparent and
accountable62 and a weak government, black market, and legacy of
dictatorship form a dangerous corruption-breeding combination. 63
George W. Bush faced strong pressure from opponents to unveil
profiteering war-related activities in Iraq. 64 Henry Waxman, who
presides over the Congressional Committee on Integrity and
Government Reform, said, "[t]he money squandered or gulped by
corruption as part of these contracts are infuriating and astonishing. We
the-need-to-re-engage-the-private-sector-smartly (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
60. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN POST-CONFLICT IRAQ,
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, (2010), available at
http://csis.org/files/publication/100317_IraqEconomicFactors.pdf (last visited Nov. 7,
2013).
6 I. See JEFFREY COONJOHN, CORRUPTION IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS: AN IRAQI
CASE STUDY, (Kurdistan Center for Democracy in the Middle East, 2012), available at
http://www.kcdme.com/Corruption%20in%20PostContlict%20Environments%2002.02.2012.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
62. TI recommended key steps to be adopted urgently before a "plague of corruption"
amounts to inevitability and irreparability. International contractors operating in Iraq,
according to the TI, must abide by the Anti- Corruption Law. Donors and allied forces are
encouraged to adopt a stricter approach in dealing with the phenomena. TI indicated a
highly corrupt post-war Iraq. See id.
63. Bribery has been rampant since the toppling of Saddam Hussein. Some contractors
and government officials have conceded that corruption widely exists. The report lashed out
at the U.S. policy of awarding investment contracts in Iraq, depicting the same as secretive
and favoring certain large companies. TI agrees with some UN bodies, such as the UN
global consultative body which reported that the U.S. awarded an oil investment contract to
the Texas-based Halliburton run by Dick Cheney until Cheney was elected Vice President
of the U.S. last December. A BBC team tracked down the missing billions in a house
inhabited by Hazem Sha'alan, who was appointed minister of defense in the 2004 Iraqi
Government in Acton, West London. Sha'alan and accomplices drained about USD 1.2
billion from the ministry by purchasing old military equipment from Poland while claiming
it to be state-of-the-art and subsequently transferring the difference in money to personal
accounts. Radi Ar-Radi, the judge who presided over the Public Commission on Integrity,
said, "They failed to rebuild the ministry of defense, and hence the continuing violence and
blood baths. Iraqis and foreigners are still slaughtered, and those corrupt officials are to be
blamed for that. They are criminals." Sha'alan was sentenced to death, but fled the country
to avoid this sentence. See id.
64. See Jane Corbin, BBC Uncovers Lost Iraqi Billions, BBC NEWS (June 10, 2008),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7444083.stm (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
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may discover that it has been the widest profiteering process m
history. " 65
The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction (SIGIR) identified two reasons for the lack of tangible
results from the reconstruction efforts in Iraq: (1) rampant corruption66
and (2) economic mismanagement. However, the 2008 federal report
revealed that the reconstruction policies adopted by Washington for Iraq
failed owing to bureaucratic division inside the Pentagon and a lack of
familiarity with the Iraqi society. 67
Today, corruption is present in the Iraqi Government at all levels.
Some ministries are obviously controlled by militias or organized crime
bosses. 68 The Iraqi Government is incapable of enforcing the bare
minimum of anti-corruption laws. 69 Furthermore, key Government
officials boldly refuse to engage in or initiate any corruption case
investigations. Consequently, the Commission of Integrity is not
70
empowered to be a true investigative authority.
Despite the powers of the comm1ss10n associated with
investigating corruption cases, it cannot fulfill its role because of fragile
security and violent criminals who are controlling various ministries. It
is impossible to investigate corruption cases without support from the
police and government. However, in Iraq, such support does not
currently exist. 71

65. Id.
66. An example cited by the report is USO 36 billion deal for military equipment,
weapons, and communication gear for the Iraqi forces, but no one knows about the fate of
this expenditure. The report also mentions that a U.S. company, DynCorp International,
submitted USO 18 million in invoices for unjustifiable costs. Furthermore, large amounts
have been mismanaged or squandered (e.g., a police training camp with a USD 43.8 million
swimming pool which was never used). See Judith Richards Hope & Edward N. Griffin,
The New Iraq: Revising Iraq's Commercial Law is a Necessity for Foreign Direct
Investment and the Reconstruction of Iraq's Decimated Economy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 875 (2004).
67. James Glanz & T. Christian Miller, supra note 10.
68. Parker, supra note 6.
69. Id.
70. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Report to Congress, SIGIR
at
available
2012),
30,
(July
OBSERVATIONS
http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/July2012/Section 1 -_July_2012.pdf#view=fit
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
71. CRISIS GROUP MIDDLE EAST REPORT No.113, FAILING OVERSIGHT: IRAQ'S
at
available
(2011 ),
GOVERNMENT
UNCHECKED
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009 20 l 4/documents/d-iq/dv/diq20111005 06_/d-iq20111005 06 en.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
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Accordingly, the commission investigators cannot be relied upon
to detect criminal activities of persons protected by the influential, even
to the extent that they cannot be protected in the course of any such
investigation. Any comment about the ability of Iraqi institutions
established to combat corruption to enforce anti-corruption laws is
pointless. Another acknowledgment to be made here is that anticorruption and law enforcement efforts have not been well planned in
the consideration of rampant corruption, which has come to take various
forms and become a means of profitable trade through which security
and military positions are acquired in exchange for money. 72 Many
officials receive bribes for these purposes. Corruption has become a
human disaster, even a matter of life or death in Iraq, and has found its
way into child vaccines, portable water, and admittance of fatal
radioactive goods and foods into Iraq. 73 The pressing question here is:
where do huge amounts of corruption-generated money go? And what
reasons are behind the increasing rates of corruption?
Most of such corruption-generated money is used to finance and
strengthen the ruling parties to ensure their survival and purchase secret
accounts outside Iraqi borders. The rest of this money is used to finance
and nurture terrorism. Increasing corruption rates are due to illegal uses
of oil revenues, which have been on the rise because of increasing oil
prices. 74

C. Diminished Infrastructure Capacity
In today's world, infrastructure receives outstanding importance, as
it is the cornerstone of economic and social development. On one hand,
infrastructure assumes the role of being the link between economic
resources of a given country and production structures therein; on the
other hand, it links production locations and markets, thus boosting
72. Arming contracts and all security-related activities are corrupting-breeding arenas
owing to the inability of the independent supervisory bodies to audit them under the pretext
of national security. See Solomon Moore, Secret Iraqi Deal Shows Problems in Arms
N.Y.
TIMES
(April
13,
2008),
available
at
Orders,
http://www. nyti mes.com/2008/04/ 13/world/middleeast/ l 3arms.html?pagewanted=all&_ r=O
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
73. See Anwar Al-Hamdani, STUDIO 9/AL-BAGHDADIYA TV (2012), available at
http://www.albaghdadia.com/programs/politics-prog/studio9.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2013)
(in Arabic).
74. Patrick Cockburn, Iraq JO Years on: How Baghdad Became a City of Corruption,
THE
INDEPENDANT
(Mar.
4,
2013),
available
at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraq-l O-years-on-how-baghdadbecame-a-city-of-corruption-8520038.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).

Published by SURFACE, 2013

17

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 5

162

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 41: 1

economic activities and their horizons and variety in addition to
improving commercial activities and promoting easier establishment of
service and production ventures.
As far as investment is concerned, in developing an efficient
infrastructure, there is an urgent and inevitable need for attracting direct
foreign investments (DFls) while enhancing the competitive edge of the
country concerned. Accordingly, the deteriorated infrastructure in Iraq
sends a negative message to foreign investors, thus limiting investorflowing opportunities. This is the impact of the abovementioned
situation on economic growth and development.
Undoubtedly, the Iraqi economy suffers from out-of-date
infrastructure, which is largely due to the wars in which Iraq has been
involved75 Iraqi infrastructure has experienced little improvement since
2003, such as construction of building roads and airports. However, the
infrastructure, e.g., transportation and electricity utilities, are still
victimized by out-of-datedness and governmental negligence. 76 It is
worthy to mention that the low77 electricity production rate has affected
the performances of other sectors, particularly the industrial sector. 78
75. The Iraq- Iran war wreaked havoc in terms of infrastructure, followed by the First
and Second Gulf Wars, which wiped it out. Acts of rampage, destruction, and looting also
contributed to the current situation. Similarly, the electricity dilemma in Iraq started with a
lack of basic materials and spare parts necessary for maintenance. Technical support for a
grid station was also lacking due to the economic blockade imposed after the 1991 Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait. The dilemma persisted up to 2003, after which Iraq only encountered
slow-motion schemes in the form of specific investment targets for the electricity sector.
Poor planning and rampant administrative corruption across the departments in the Ministry
of Electricity account for this persistent predicament. See William Nordhaus, The Economic
Consequeces of a War with Iraq, YALE U. (Oct. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.econ.yale.edu/-nordhaus/iraq.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2013); Asad, Qaragholi,
& Sachs supra note 59.
76. Dahr Jamail, A Country in Shambles, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/0l/2012141151938534 8.html (last visited
Nov. 7, 2013).
77. An annual growth rate of 2.8% during the 1990s has been achieved in terms of
electricity production, marking a rate lower than the population growth rate. In return,
electricity consumption has increased by an annual rough rate of 8%, marking a clear divide
in the electricity production levels. Electricity station operation ratings have remained lower
than needed; as a result, 25% of the institutional capacity in Iraq was hit despite an increase
in electricity production over four years following 2003, with a total institutional capacity of
3550 megawatts in 2004, which increased to 5390 megawatts during 2005 only to regress to
4500 megawatts in 2006 owing to the increasing sabotage against electricity stations and
towers. The Ministry of Electricity produced only 6850 megawatts in 2013, which means a
daily operation capacity of 12 hours. See STATISTICS PRODUCTION ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC
POWER IN IRAQ, SUPERVISORY ANALYSIS 2014(2014) (in Arabic).
78. The low-capacity infrastructure in Iraq, especially in terms of electricity
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Terrorist attacks pose a key danger to the shyly growing
infrastructure, especially when it comes to electricity transmission
towers and railways. 79 In fact, the lack of strategic thinking and
appropriate execution of reformative schemes for institutions concerned
with provision of the services needed for infrastructure rehabilitation
and development has resulted in a ramshackle and deteriorated the
national infrastructure. 80 Unfortunately, the excessively weak
infrastructure has contributed to foreign investors' reluctance to invest
in Iraq, as such infrastructure would increase operational and reach-out
costs for local and international markets alike. Eventually, this situation
discourages foreign investment in Iraq.
III.

DETERMINANTS OF LEGAL FRAMEWORK

This section highlights the nature of legal limitations that have
relatively precluded foreign investment flows and distorted the
investment environment. It further analyzes existing legal limitations,
which can be classified into three levels:

A. Inadequate Protection and Enforcement ofIntellectual Property
Rights
Laws regarding intellectual property rights in Iraq do not comply
with the provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in several respects. Copyright Law
No. 3 of 1971 is not completely harmonious in its use of terms such as
"author" and "original author" or in its references to the rights included
in a copyright and for holders of such rights. 81 For example, the
protection range set forth in the Copyright Law is narrow and only

production, will impact all other sectors, particularly the industrial sector, given the urgent
and inevitable need for projects to create electrically powered units. Given the abysmal
distribution capacity of this sector and the resulting longer blackout periods, individuals and
institutions, especially those in the private sector, have sought to come up with alternatives
from private generators to make up for the power shortage. Such generators are fuel
powered. This leads to increasing electricity costs and consequently higher direct costs in
the form of higher production costs for production projects. Therefore, one may say that less
efficient infrastructure is a major hindrance to investment. See Why Business is Still in the
Dumps, THE ECONOMIST (July 1, 2010), available at http://economist.com/node/16488938
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
79. Jamail, supra note 76.
80. Corbin, supra note 65.
81. See Bashar Malkawi, Iraqi Patent Law: In Search of Compliance with TRIPS, 37
INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 591 (2007) [hereinafter Malkawi, Iraqi Patent].
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provides for consolidated data without any reference to other articles, 82
while TRIPS provide for readable, selection-based, or content-orderbased works. 83 Similarly, Malkawi noted that Copyright Law No. 3 of
1971 does not address whether the exclusive right to adapt a work
includes the right to make a cinematographic adaptation of the work. 84
Further, the protection term under the aforesaid Iraqi Copyright
Law lags well behind TRIPS, 85 with the law providing for the first
public issue as the commencement date for protection. 86
The Trademark Law 87 violates the provisions of TRIPS in that it
allows for the filing of appeals and application of decisions of the
trademark registrar before the Minister of Industry and Minerals. 88
However, TRIPS provides for litigation before independent
administrative and/or judicial entities. 89
Moreover, despite the introduction of amendments to the Iraqi
Trademark Law, it still lacks in the use of state-of-the-art technology in
filing trademark registration applications, mainly because red tape
procedures are time- and money-consuming as well as less effective. 90
Regarding patents, pursuant to TRIPS, a patent must be a novel
innovation and applicable industry-wide. However, compared to Article
27 of TRIPS, Iraqi Patent Law No. 65 of 1970 does not explicitly set
forth patent-awarding requirements. Therefore, Iraqi legislators have
made up for this shortcoming through Article 2 of Patent Law No. 65 of
1970, which was produced to fulfill the aforementioned requirements. 91
In certain parts, Iraqi Patent Law No. 65 of 1970 goes further than

82. Bashar Hikmet Malkawi, Iraq's Accession to the WTO: Commitments and
Implications, 6 J. INT'L TRADE L. & PoL'Yl4, 19 (2007) [hereinafter Malkawi, Iraq 's
Accession].
83. See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property at Art. l 0.2,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04_e.htm (last visited Sept.
26, 2013) [hereinafter TRIPS].
84. See Malkawi, Iraq's Accession, supra note 82.
85. See TRIPS, supra note 83, at arts. 20.4, 6.
86. See id. at art. 12 ("[S]uch a term shall be no less than 50 years from the end of the
calendar year of authorized publication, or, failing such authorized publication within 50
years from the making of the work, 50 years from the end of the calendar year of making.").
87. It is worth mentioning that compatibility exists between the Iraqi Law and TRIPs
in terms of the visual sensitivity requirement for trademarks. See Malkawi, Iraq's
Accession, supra note 82.
88. Id.
89. See TRIPS, supra note 83, at art. 24.3.
90. See Malkawi, Iraqi Patent, supra note 81.
91. See Malkawi, Iraq's Accession, supra note 82.
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TRIPS in that it includes even biological patents for development of
methods of diagnosis and treatment, surgeries, and protection of flora
and fauna. Accordingly, Article 3 of the law should be amended to
accommodate exclusions provided for under Article 27 of TRIPS. 92
The provisions of the law regarding "fair compensation" are
ambiguous; an innovator may claim fair compensation from the relevant
employer in return for such an innovation as long as the same is covered
by the employment contract period, unless such a contract provides for
a specific compensation for an innovation. This provision may well
leave the door wide open for several predictions on accepting
compensation, setting a fair compensation mechanism in accordance
with the significance and importance of the innovation in question, and
the entity associated with setting the compensation value. 93
Once again, Patent Law No. 65 fails to refer disputes to judicial
entities. Article 33 of the law allows for appealing a registrar's decision
to void a patent before the competent minister, while TRIPS provides
for judicial referral to settle such disputes. 94 The protection period for an
industrial prototype is seven years as per the Iraqi Patent Law No. 65,
but 10 years as per TRIPS, in yet another violation of TRIPS. 95
Furthermore, the Iraqi Government's ability to enforce protection
of intellectual property rights and enforcement of relevant laws is
extremely weak. In addition, Iraqi laws on intellectual property rights
lack procedural measures for border-based customs management when
it comes to purchasing illegal copies of commodities and shipping them
across borders amounting to violations of property rights. 96 Moreover,
such laws are not enforced in the first place. For example, it is possible
to find hacked copies in public stores. The Iraqi laws on intellectual
property rights do not authorize competent authorities to self-act for
92. Id.
93. See Elizabeth Mirza Al-Dajani, Post Saddam Restructuring of Intellectual Property
Rights in Iraq Through a Case Study of Current Intellectual Property Practices in Lebanon,
Egypt, and Jordan, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 250 (2006).
94. See TRIPS, supra note 83, at art. 32.
95. See Malkawi, Iraq's Accession, supra note 82, at 19.
96. It is hoped that the new intellectual property bill will comply with Articles 51-60
of TRIPS regarding the competent court judgment requirement to finalize customs clearance
procedures of commodities suspected to be violating intellectual property rights. See 2013
INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT- IRAQ, U.S. DEP'T OF ST. (2013), available at
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204661.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). For this
purpose, a national committee has been established by the Council of Ministers of relevant
Iraqi ministries, syndicates, trade bodies, and the private sector to draft a new intellectual
property rights bill covering all related intellectual property rights. See id.
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confiscating materials that are proven to be violating property rights.
Furthermore, registry organizations in ministries and government bodies
concerned with the protection of intellectual property rights are still
using primitive tools that do not meet international standards. Finally,
the Iraqi laws on intellectual property rights are dispersed under several
laws managed by several bodies. Hence, there is an urgent need to
consolidate all intellectual property rights under one easily referred to
law. 97
B. Unclear Iraqi Laws for Ratification ofInternational Arbitration
Awards

Iraqis an active member of the Arab League ofNations, and in this
respect, 9 the country is often governed by stipulations from the 1985
Riyadh Convention, 99 which provides a common framework through
which member states enforce laws (including arbitration laws). 100
According to Articles 251-276 of the country's civil laws, any
arbitration proceedings taking place in the country are normally
considered to be a domestic issue (even though it may involve a foreign
party). 101 However, with recent changes in legislation, foreign nationals
or parties can decide to choose foreign arbitration. 102
Most states across the globe are common signatories to the New
97. See Malkawi, Iraq's Accession, supra note 82, at 19.
98. According to Article 3 oflraq's 2005 Constitution, "Iraq is a country of multiple
nationalities, religions, and sects. It is a founding and active member in the Arab League
and is committed to its charter, and it is part of the Islamic world. Article 3, Doustour
Jaumbouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005, available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=l0027 (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
99. The Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation was signed on June 4, 1983,
in "Riyadh," by all the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice except Egypt and Islamic
Republic of Comoros. Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation, LEAGUE OF ARAB
STATES (April 6, 1983), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38d8.html
(last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
100. Id. at art. 37. "Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 28 and 30 of this
Agreement, adjudications of arbitrators shall be recognized and executed by any contracting
party in the manner stipulated in this part subject to the legal norms of the requested party,
and the competent judicial authority of the requested party may neither discuss the subject
of such arbitration nor refuse to execute the judgment, except in the following cases: (a) If
the law of the requested party does not permit the settlement of the subject of the dispute by
arbitration, (b) If the adjudication of the arbitrators is made in execution of a condition or
arbitration contract that is void or has not become final, (c) If the arbitrators are noncompetent under the contract or condition of arbitration or under the law on the basis of
which the adjudication was made." Id.
101. Saleh Majid, Arbitration in Iraq, 19 ARAB L.Q. 267 (2004).
102. SHUBBER, supra note 1, at 139-140.
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York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitrary
Awards, but Iraq failed to be a signatory to the agreement and is
therefore excluded from the convention. 103
Requirements for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitration decisions in Iraq are unclear because the Law on
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Iraq (No. 30 of 1928) and the
Civil Procedural Law (No. 83 of 1969) do not regulate such decisions.
Accordingly, foreign arbitration decisions may not be enforceable in
Iraq, since this principle cannot be deduced from the provisions
neglecting the same. Furthermore, Law No. 30 of 1928 has provided
explicitly for the scope of enforcement in that it requires a decision or
judgment to be handed down by a court formed outside Iraq for it to be
enforceable in Iraq. 104
Iraqi commentators adopt two opinions regarding this negative
attitude: the first allows for enforcement, while the second denies such
enforcement. Advocates of the first opinion say that foreign arbitration
judgments can be enforced in Iraq despite the lack of a legal provision
to this end. The argument behind this is that the Arbitration Section of
Iraqi Civil Procedure Law No. 83 of 1969 does not specify judgments
within the scope thereof. 105 Therefore, such scope cannot be restricted
without an explicit legal provision. Accordingly, it covers national and
foreign arbitration judgments, i.e., an absolute provision remains so
unless restricted by another. According to this opinion, irrespective of
whether foreign arbitration judgments are covered by international
conventions for enforcement of foreign arbitrator's judgments, 106 they
shall be enforced. Moreover, the acceptance of such enforcement in the
country has become a principle of private law that is common across the
103. Abdel Sattar al-Beriqdar, spokesman for Iraq's High Judicial Council, told RFE
that Iraq is keen to join the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitrary Awards. See generally Iraq Drafting International Arbitration
RADIO
FREE
EUR.
RADIO
LIBERTY
(2011),
available
at
Law,
http://www.rferl.org/content/iraq_arbitration/2320391.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
Despite the fact that Iraqi officials have indicated that they are going to sign the New York
convention treaty, their failure to do so means that if a foreign national or company is to
obtain an arbitration award against an Iraqi company (or individual), it will have to enforce
the same through the courts. See PAULSSON ET AL., FRESHFIELDS GUIDE TO ARBITRATION
CLAUSES in INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (3d ed. 2011 ).
104. See Dr. Hamzeh Haddad, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Award in Jordan
and Iraq, Lecture Before the IBA Conference of Bahrain (Mar. 8, 1989), in ARAB INSTITUTE
OF ARBITRATION & ADR, available at http://www.aiadr.com/aiadr°/o20re/2.pdf (last visited
Nov. 4, 2013).
105. Id.
l 06. Maj id, supra note 101.
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world, as any judgment so handed down in the country is required to be
enforced. Hence, such enforcement is acceptable in Iraq as per Article
30 of the applicable Iraqi Civil Law, which provides the following:
"Any matter not covered by the previous articles regarding conflict of
laws shall be governed by the most common private international law
principles." However, the second opinion rejects the above argument,
as the advocates of the same are (rightly so) in favor of non-acceptance
of foreign arbitration judgments in Iraq unless the same are regulated by
international bilateral or multilateral agreements providing for
enforcement of the arbitrators' judgments in the contracting country if
Iraq is party thereto. 107
In addition, enforcement of foreign arbitration judgments is one of
the most common principles of the private international law worldwide,
and hence, the potential enforcement thereof in Iraq pursuant to Article
30 of the Iraqi Civil Law may not be accepted in this respect because
the aforesaid Article is restricted to a subject of the private international
law or conflict of laws. It reads as follows: "Any matter not covered by
the previous Articles regarding conflict of laws shall be governed by the
most common private international law principles." 108 Considering the
fact that enforcement of foreign arbitration judgments is not a case of
conflict of laws, the said Article is not applicable thereto. 109
Therefore, foreign arbitrator judgments including those handed
down to settle foreign investment contracts are not applicable in Iraq
unless provided for by international agreements. In any event, for the
purposes of enforcement of arbitration decisions by the concerned
executive authorities, the approval of such a decision by the competent
court after payment of fees pursuant to Article 272 (Fil) of Iraqi Civil
Procedure Law No. 83 of 1969 is a requirement of the Iraqi laws. The
purpose of this procedure is to monitor the arbitrators' work through
approval or revocation judgments handed down by the competent court
on the ground that arbitrators are different from judges in terms of legal
experience. Another reason is to ensure that the arbitrators' decisions
are not illegal in either subject or form. 110

107. ABDUL HAMID EL-AHDAB & JALAL EL-AHDAB, ARBITRATION WITH THE ARAB
COUNTRIES 230 (3d ed. 2011).
108. Majid, supra note 101.
109. EL-AHDAB, supra note 107, at 230.
110. Haddad, supra note 104.
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C. Institutional Capabilities ofIraqi Judiciary
Undoubtedly, the Iraqi judiciary has adopted a number of steps to
wm foreign investors interested in Iraq. 111 However, there are many
111. In the aftermath of 2003, a new position was introduced in the Iraqi judiciary.
Additionally, some key reforms were introduced in the Iraqi judicial system; e.g., the
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) was restructured by Provisional Civil Coalition Authority
(PCCA) Order No. 35, whereby the SJC was assigned supervision of the Iraqi judicial
system independently from the Ministry of Justice. The said order was followed by the
PCCA-enacted Law No. 12 on May 8, 2004, which was designed to boost an independent
judiciary by providing for administrative and financial independence of the SJC from the
Ministry of Justice. See Benjamin B. Brockman-Hawe, The Iraqi High Court: A
Retrospective and Prospective View, 14 TILBURG L. REV. 422 (2008). An independent
judiciary is enshrined and well-established in the Iraqi Constitution under Article 4 7, which
provides for establishing three federal powers in the State of Iraq, the independence of
which shall established by the Constitution: legislative, executive, and judicial powers.
Each of these powers shall conduct their work under the "separation of powers" principle.
See Bassiouni, supra note 48. Furthermore, the judicial power shall be independent, with
duties and functions conducted by courts of various degrees and types. See Christina J.
Sheetz & Matthew T. Simpson, Symposium: Rethinking the Future: The Next Five Years in
Iraq, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 181 (2009).
Courts shall hand down their judgments pursuant to the applicable laws. In addition to this
point, judges shall be independent and not subject by any power except that of the law in
the course of conducting their duties. No power may interfere with judicial affairs or
administration of justice. See Bassiouni, supra note 48.
Additionally, the Commercial Court has been created recently by virtue of the SJC
Statement No. 136, issued on 01/11/2010, which is the first specialist court in Iraq to be
assigned cases in which a party is a non-Iraqi. After the establishment of the economic
open-door policy in Iraq, it has become inevitable to create commercial courts to assure
investors of the presence of an impartial specialist court that allows for summary settlement
of disputes. Furthermore, a foreign investor may not only plead before such a court in the
course of legal proceedings marking disputes with private sector entities but also with
entities from the Iraqi Government. The only difference between a commercial court and a
court of first instance lies in the involvement of non-Iraqi litigants. However, in a
commercial case with Iraqi litigants, a court of first instance shall be the competent court.
See JUDICIARY, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMERCIAL COURT (2010), available at
http://www.iraqja.iq/view.680/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (in Arabic); see also Jordan E.
Toone, Foreign Direct Investment in Iraq: Reassessing the Legal Framework, BYU I.L. &
MGMT. Rev., (Sept. 25, 2012), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2152037 (last visited
Oct. 29, 2013). The first judgment of the Commercial Court revoked the decision of the
Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MoIM), which was the defendant (the trademark
registering party) on the French Veolia Environment and condemned the defendant for
registering a trademark in the plaintiff's name pursuant to the legally applicable ways.
Veolia Environment, the plaintiff, filed an application with the relevant department of the
defendant to register its trademark, Veolia Environment, in several types of commodities
and goods following the defendant's refusal to register the same on no legal grounds
because the trademark was a two-word phrase, while the other trademark was a one-word
phrase in upper case letters and placed inside a square frame. The trademark to which the
subject matter of the case is related is not framed and is written in lower case letters.
Therefore, no similarity exists between both trademarks, and thus, the case was dismissible.

Published by SURFACE, 2013

25

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 5

170

Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 41: 1

challenges ahead, which are obstacles to creating a national world-class
judiciary.
The challenge encountered by the Iraqi judiciary is the unmet dire
needs of judicial institutions in terms of resources, training, and
Lack of experience in foreign investment disputes,
facilities.
international arbitration, training for judges, and court officers or
employees are the major concerns. 112 Foreign investors' trust the Iraqi
judicial system has been compromised by political interferences with
judicial work, 113 mainly in the form of personal safety threats against
114
judges, thus undermining the efficacy of judicial institutions.
Furthermore, outdated legislations and delayed legal reforms undermine
the integrity of the judiciary and Iraq's. abidance to international
obligations under international law. 115 Clearly, this leads to delayed
judgments. As a result of the enforcement of the De-Baathification
Law, many judges have been relieved of office on the grounds of being
members of the Baath Party. 116 As a result, only 750 judges remain to
Moreover, the court reviewed the original copy of the trademark layout and decided to
appoint three judicial exports to look into the matter. They confirmed non-similarity
between both trademarks and the subsequent cheating and deceiving of the public into
buying trademarked commodities bearing misleading trademarks that are not identical.
There is a clear verbal difference in the pronunciations of the trademarks, and hence, the
experts grounded the report, which is valid for a judgment pursuant to Article 140 (1) of
Evidence Law. The Court handed down its judgment based on Articles 5 and 10 of the
Trademark and Commercial Logos Law No. 21 of 1957. See Commercial Court, Judicial B
No. 315 I commercial court I 118 (2011) (in Arabic).
112. Court administrations still feature many administrative technique problems on a
large scale, all of which are obsolete. Such techniques include keeping case records, not
integrating records, and primitive and weak exchanges of information. These methods are
causing a lot of concern owing to the resulting potential disclosure of case details. See
U.N.E.P., IRAQ INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY ASSESSMENT REPORT 18, 25 (2006), available at
http://www. unep .org/disastersandconflicts/portals/ 15 5/disastersandconflicts/docs/iraq/I CA_i
raq_report.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013); QED GROUP, LLC, IRAQ INSTITUTIONAL
CAPACITY BUILDING (ICB) ASSESSMENT, USAIDIIRAQ 2, 52 (May 2010), available at
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADW087.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
113. AB.A., JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR IRAQ 35 (2006).
114. Id. at 29. Terrorist attacks against judges may well cast shadows on the country's
judicial institutions because investigations and trials are usually followed by threats and
violence against judges concerned, thus compromising their abilities to fairly and
impartially look into cases. See id. Most judges lack knowledge of personal security details
or sufficient training therein. Id. Other areas of lacking include provisions of a judicial safe
house, safe workplace, and firearms ·license. Id. A total of 58 judges and 70 judicial
officers were killed between 2003 and 2012. See Martyrs of Judges, Iraqja.iq (May 30,
2012), available at http://www.iraqja.iq/shheedq.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) (in Arabic).
115. AB.A., supra note 112, at 19.
116. Jeffrey J. Coonjohn & Zuhair al-Maliki, Chaos in the Courts Can Iraq's

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/5

26

Al Abasey: Cakes Without Sugar: Reasons Behind Foreign Investor Reluctance t

2013]

Cakes Without Sugar

171

serve nation-wide judicial needs. Despite the fact that the appointment
of judges is a top priority for the SJC, it has been slow and accompanied
by a lack of experience among new judges in handling specific issues
such as foreign investment disputes. 117
IV.

PILLARS OF THE INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT
SUFFER SUBSTANTIAL CRACKS

Although Iraq has taken significant steps to create an attractive and
competitive investment environment together with the enactment of
Investment Law No. 13 of 2006 and establishment of the National
Investment Commission, which has given way to rising hopes of strong
Iraq-bound foreign investment flows, the following limitations account
partly for foreign investors' reluctance to flow into Iraq.
A. Imbalance in Investment Commissions
The facilitating procedures of foreign investors' dealings with
government commissions in the investment hosting country would
normally mark a positive economic and commercial activity
encouraging attitude. 1 8 Therefore, the Iraqi Investment Law No. 13 of
2006 provides for establishing investment commissions 119 that shall be
responsible for developing and planning national investment policies,
facilitating investment law enforcement by enacting regulations and
directives, and monitoring the execution of strategic investment
projects. 120
However, the Iraqi National Investment Commission (NIC) was
born politically dependent. Political rifts and corruption cast shadows

Embattled Chief Justice Fend-off Presidential Strategists, JJCOONJOHN.COM (Feb 26. 2013),
available at http://jjcoonjohn.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Chaos-in-the-Courts-.pdf
(last visited Oct. 27, 2013); Pfiffner, supra note 21. The Chief Justice was removed from
service on the grounds of being a member of the Baath Party. Coonjohn, supra; Pfiffner,
supra note 21. Jeffrey Coonjohn, a Senior Policy Advisor working in the Middle East,
North Africa, and Central Asia commented, "Valentine's Day was none too sweet for Iraq's
Chief Justice Medhat al-Mahmoud this year. Coonjohn, supra note 115; Pfiffner, supra
note 21. The 79-year-old jurist awoke to find himself ignominiously ousted from his post as
a result of having once been Saddam Hussein's personal legal advisor." Coonjohn, supra;
Pfiffner, supra note 21.
117. A.B.A., supra note 113, at 18.
118. SHUBBER, supra note 1, at 48.
119. See The Investment Law Oct. 2006 Article 4, TRADE, available at
http://trade.gov/static/iraq_investmentlaw.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) [hereinafter
Investment Law].
120. SHUBBER, supra note 1, at 49.
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largely on the commission performance of the local NIC. 121 Political
quotas played a key role in choosing NIC officers and employees, thus
leading to incompetent individuals being entrusted with the
responsibility of management of investment commissions. 122
Furthermore, the private sector, represented by high-profile
businessmen or key investors, is not represented in the NIC board. 123
Much to Iraq's detriment, the non-professional administration of some
investment commissions has led to politically-motivated decisions
granting or denying investment licenses; 124 investment commissions
have not been far from the government bodies causing corruption, of
which the Commission of Integrity (Col) has detected several cases of
blackmailing foreign investors into bribing employees for completing or
approving investments and disburse payments.
The NIC has not fulfilled its role, nor has it worked smoothly, as it
failed to reconstruct a foreign investment friendly environment.
Moreover, the NIC never had an investment advancement plan and even
lacked a comprehensive vision to plan for foreign investment
attraction. 125 All of this led to incorrect investment choices in terms of
121. Consequences of political rifts in the Iraqi Government include lack of
coordination concerning obtainment of approvals for key projects that end up rejected owing
to the non-obtainment of necessary approvals because of political rifts in decision-making
circles. See Hussein Tamimi, Iraq Needs to Rehabilitate and Expand Infrastructure
Investment through the Gate, NENO's PLACE (Jan. 17, 2013), available at
http://nenosplace.forumotion.com/t973-iraq-needs-to-rehabilitate-and-expandinfratstructure-investment-through-the-gate (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
122. See Assessment of Current and Anticipated Economic Priorities in Iraq, USAIDTIJARA
at
A-79
(2012),
available
at
https://tijarairaq .com/?pname=resources_ tech&doctype=2 l &t_t=Technical_Reports (last visited Oct.
27, 2013) [hereinafter USAID]. In general, NIC employees show a very modest level of
expertise and competence, especially in terms of mastering foreign languages,
administrative systems, and e-control. Iraq Investment Climate Statement Bureau of
Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, IRAQPROJECT.COM, available at
http://iraqproject.com/investment-in-iraq/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
123. See Investment Law, supra note 119.
124. The most critical point here is that investment commissions have lost their
institutional professionalism regarding the vision behind establishment and performance.
They are the victims of political pressures that have affected their performance. For such
reasons, investment commissions have lost their credibility and necessary political support
to interact effectively with investors and national institutions (as put forward by the Council
of Representatives). See Rahim al-Uqailee, Corruption in Iraq Hampered Investment, 117
JUDICIARY 12 (2012) (in Arabic).
125. The NIC does not have a clear-cut integrated plan for current or future investment
opportunities. Qusay al-Abadi, a member of the Parliamentary Economy and Investment
Committee, called to cancel the national investment for failing to ensure the success of the
investment process in the country. See Ahmed Hussein, Ebadi Suggests Canceling Iraqi
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serving Iraqi development priorities. 126 In addition, the NIC could have
played a greater role in supporting Iraqi legislators and the government
via identification of key obstacles to foreign investment inflow, with a
view to adopting appropriate solutions considering direct contact of the
NIC with investors, which enables the NIC to spot obstacles to smooth
inflows of foreign investments into Iraq. 127
Iraq's foreign investment promotion policy has never been
commensurate with the country's investment needs. Shortcomings in
terms of promotion have been a key characteristic of the NIC; the NIC
has never established a promotion unit through which it may raise
awareness of the parties concerned through media campaigns,
conferences, or websites, thus creating a "foggy" perspective in the
already investor-reluctant investment environment. 128
Furthermore, despite the participation of the NIC in international
and national affairs, the organization needs more effective and active
participation to attract individuals and corporations to Iraq by displaying
available investment opportunities, distributing promotional booklets
and holding direct meetings with key investors or companies to provide
first-hand knowledge of investment projects in the country. 129
In addition, the NIC Marketing Department lacks strategic means
for targeting and building relationships with clients. Most NIC
employees do not master communication and foreign-language skills.
The mechanisms adopted to follow planning and project-licensing

National Investment Commission, IRAQI NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012), available at
http://www.iraqinews.com/baghdad-politics/ebadi-suggests-canceling-iraqi-nationalinvestment-commission/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2013); John Lee, Sadrist MP calls for
Abolition of NIC, IRAQ Bus. NEWS (Jan. 11, 2013), available at http://www.iraqbusinessnews.com/?s=Failure+of+iraq+National+lnvestment+ Commission&x=42&y=l6
(last visited Oct. 28, 2013); Qusay al-Abadi, Call to Cancel the Investment Commissions,
ALL
IRAQ
NEWS
(2012),
available
at
http://www.alliraqnews.com/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=:2012-1 Ol l-16-3 7-4 l &catid=4 l :201 l-04-08-l 7-27-2 l&ltemid=86 (last visited Oct. 28, 2013).
126. NIC suggestions, proposed by local investment commissions, should be studied,
prioritized, and then listed as part of the wider national investment plan. See SUPPORTING
INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ, supra note 4, at 16, 18.
127. The NIC argues that it has never been enabled to serve as an independent,
empowered member to adopt an investment attraction and sustainment strategy, but suffers
from governmental and political pressures. See id. at 20.
128. The NIC lacks sufficient and accurate information about the investment
environment in Iraq, particularly about the legal framework to establish investments, seize
available investment opportunities, and provide statistics and studies. See id. at 38.
129. See Mohammed al-Musawi, Weaknesses in the Performance of Investment
Commissions, 18 AL-QADISIYA L. SCI. 350 (2013) (in Arabic).
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processes such as design, purchase, production, distribution, marketing,
post-transaction services, search, and development are still paperbased.130 Furthermore, the NIC Department of Statistics has only
limited and far from accurate statistics, which lack any classification or
analyses. This leads to difficult investment decision-making in the light
of uncertainties owing to a lack of a reliable database. 131
The performance of the NIC has always been distorted by conflicts
and interference with ministries. Despite entrusting the NIC with the
responsibility of planning and executing investment projects, the
investment and development departments in other government bodies
that are entrusted with establishing ministry specific investments are
still in charge of such planning and execution. This led to a lack of a
comprehensive investment vision. 132 Therefore, the long-awaited
objective of reconstructing the national economy has never
materialized. This was further worsened by the presence of weak
political will in standardizing the existing institutional framework of
action, the controversial applicable laws, which are too ambiguous to
settle such duplication of roles. 133
The NIC-provincial investment commission relationship is all
about interference in terms of power and capacities despite the
supervisory powers given to the NIC and the requirements that such
provincial bodies act in line with the National Investment Plan. 134
However, there is an objection to the non-regulation of potential
conflicts between the NIC and provincial or territorial counterparts. A
clear manifestation of this conflict materialized in cooperation cessation
and contract termination threats delivered by the Iraqi Government to
Shell and Exxon Mobil, should the latter sign contracts with the
Government of Iraqi Kurdistan. 135 As explained by the Central
Government, the reason behind such disputes is that the Kurdistan
Board of Investment is not authorized to issue oil exploration
130. See Zainab Abbas, National Investment Commission Under the Hammer, 18 ALQADISIY AL. SCI. 350 (2011) (in Arabic).
131. SUPPORTING INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ, supra note
4, at 38.
132. USAID, supra note 122, at 27.
133. Id. at 38, 47.
134. al-Musawi, supra note 129.
135. The Exxon Mobil-Kurd oil deal spat spotlights Iraq's juggling act between
politics and investments. See Alice Fordham & Dan Morse, Exxon Mobil Dispute Deepens
Arab-Kurd Spit in Iraq, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2012), available at
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/20 l 2-04-05/world/35453128_ 1_ kurdistan-regionalgovemment-kurdish-region-exxon-mobil (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
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licenses. 136 The Iraqi Ministry of Oil continually requests that
Kurdistan notify the ministry of all oil agreements signed by the latter
with international companies. 137 In tum, the Ministry of Natural Wealth
and Resources in Kurdistan argues that the Iraqi Constitution gives Iraqi
provinces the right to enter into contracts with oil companies. 138 It
appears that such disputes will persist because of the lack of legislation
for regulating Iraqi oil wealth. 1 9 The Iraqi legislature is blamed for not
referring to the legal personality of the govemorate non-provincial
investment authorities so that it can enjoy the same personality as the
National Investment Authority in Baghdad. This lack of legal
personality would limit their powers regarding issuance of investment
licenses for investors considering such authorities' financial
dependence. 140
For these reasons, some Iraqi writers and officials have called for a
"Supreme Investment Council" along the lines of the Supreme Energy
Council, which was formed in neighboring Arab countries. This council
is supposed to consist of the NIC, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of
Planning, and representatives from departments of investment in other
ministries and bodies under the management of the Ministerial
Cabinet. 141
The objective of setting up the Supreme Investment Council is to
settle existing disputes between the NI C and ministries and standardize
investment plans and efforts. 142 This can be realized by setting up the

136. The Iraqi Government declared the illegality of production-sharing agreements
between foreign companies and the Kurdistan Regional Government. Rex J. Zedalis, Iraqi
Oil Revenues from its Sale: A Review of How Existing Security Council Resolutions Affected
and the Past ad May Shape the Future, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 499 (2007). For instance,
Hussain al-Shahristani, Deputy Prime Minister of Energy Affairs, said, "Iraq was 'weighing
measures' that it may take against Exxon after the company signed what the central
government considers to be illegal contracts with the Kurds." Id.
137. See Johnny West, Iraq's Last Widow: Diffusing the Risks of a Petro-State (Ctr.
For Global Dev., Working Paper No. 266, 2011); Abbas, supra note 130.
138. ZEDALIS, supra note 28, at 31.
139. Iraqi Oil Minister Mr. Ghadban stated, "I am not optimistic that the energy law
will be adopted in the coming months, and I would be happy if it is adopted by the end of
the year." He also stated that, "The more the law is delayed, the more we will have problems
such as the one with Exxon Mobil." See Kadim Ajrash & Nayla Razzouk, Iraq's Oil Law
May Be Pushed Till End of 2012, Ghadhban Says, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2012), available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-02/iraq-s-energy-law-may-be-delayed-for-restof-year-ghadhban-says.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
140. al-Musawi, supra note 129.
141. al-Abadi, supra note 125.
142. SUPPORTING INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ, supra note
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proposed Supreme Investment Council, which will have the upper hand
in decisions taken by ministries and the NIC, thus leading to the
commitment of conflicting parties to the enforcement of the same.
Considering its high-level political management, the Supreme
Investment Council may well overcome the obstacle of political rifts.
However, this study argues against the establishment of the Supreme
Investment Council, thus adding another obstacle to the already
obstacle-ridden institutional framework. The viability of a national
investment commission under the role assigned to the Supreme
Investment Council is questionable. If the solution is to introduce an
administrative council, reform should be introduced a fortiori to the
NIC. Accordingly, the key critique thrown at the suggestion lies in the
violation of principles on which Investment Law No. 13 of 2006 is
based.

B. Bureaucracy in Land Allocation for Investment Projects
In the pre-1991 war era, Iraq had an outstanding position in the
Middle East thanks to its distinguishable abilities in public sector
management, which used to have a segment of well-trained and highly
qualified civil servants. 143 While good institutional capabilities still exist
across several fields, the long years of war and international isolation
resulted in the following issues: (1) diminished investments in key
domains of public sector management which diminished the
administrative capabilities of civil service; (2) very large numbers of
public sector employees stemming from a lack of job opportunities
elsewhere (the Iraqi Government has become one of the largest pools of
employees worldwide); (3) limited e-governance and automation; (4)
lower credit standards, higher corruption rates, and a weaker public
144
All these
sector; and (5) inefficient economic governance in general.
factors combine to yield a weaker and less efficient government,
particularly when it comes to the ability to provide key services and
1 5
assume responsibility for organizational responsibilities.
The main shortcoming to be spotted here is the strictly central
administration that rules by unquestionable orders and the

4, at 37.
143. Coyne & Pellillo, supra note 6.
144. USAID, supra note 122, at 52.
145. See, e.g., ABBAS ALNASRAWI, THE ECONOMY OF IRAQ: OIL, WARS,
DESTRUCTION OF DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS,1950-2010 168-169(2010); SUPPORTING
INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ, supra note 4, at 102.
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accompanying red tape that takes the form of a series of orders and
bodes. 46 This type of administration has fallen afoul of requirements
for investments because the latter requires simple, out-of-the-box, and
swift mechanisms to come to fruition. 47
Along with the complicated political transition, the administration
related challenges prevented the enforcement of necessary structural
changes to re-engineer the government and its mechanisms. Red tape,
lack of administrative efficiency, and blackmailing investors are key
obstacles to investments, as seen by Sarni al-Aa'raj, head of the NIC. 148
The One-Stop-Shop Authority (OSSA) is the only entity an
investor would visit if willing to be in Iraq. The OSSA facilitates the
investment process by equipping investors with the investment permit
without interference by the bureaucratic red tape. 149
However, the one-stop-shop policy has not eliminated the red tape;
even by bringing investment and land allocation licensing processes to a
more complicated level there is still the requirement to obtain approvals
from a large number of ministries and bodies. 15 For example,
considering Iraq's position as the world's second largest country with
oil reserves, the exploration operations for which are still underway,
approval must be obtained from the Ministry of Oil to establish an
investment on a given part of land. Difficulties can be easily imagined if

°

146. See Coyne & Pellillo, supra note 6.
147. Id.
148. See Abdul Malik Mahmoud, Investment in Iraq: Reality or Illusion?, 83 ALRRAUD
MAG. 8 (2012). Abdullah al-Ismaili, head of Development Affairs at the Omani Gulf Energy
Company, said that the investment process has several obstacles and red tape to the extent of
scaling down ambitions of foreign investors, particularly in terms of obtaining licenses for
investments and importing materials to be used for such investments. See al-Musawi, supra
note 129. In tum, Taymour al-Byali, the representative of a U.S. construction company,
said that the current situation in Iraq requires many measures, most of which are
complicated. See Mahmoud, supra. Furthermore, the Vice President of the Parliamentary
Committee on Provinces, Mansour at-Tamimi, told Free Iraq Radio that the investment
problem in Iraq is very complex owing to myriad obstacles, highlighting that the way
investors are dealt with is too poor for them to maintain their investments in Iraq.
Accordingly, the investment environment has become repellent rather than attractive. AtTamimi also revealed that the one-stop-shop has failed in terms of investment facilitation.
Selling or leasing lands for purposes of investment is very complicated because of red tape
and conflicts between investment authorities and institutional owners of such lands. See
Abbas, supra note 130.
149. See JAMES A. BAKER III & LEE H. HAMILTON, THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT
(2006), available at http://media.usip.org/reports/iraq_study_group_report.pdf (last visited
Oct. 28, 2013 ).
150. SUPPORTING INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ, supra note
4, at 35-36.

Published by SURFACE, 2013

33

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 5

178

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 41: 1

the reply obtained from the Ministry of Oil is "oil or other sources of
energy soil tests are not finalized." 151
The NIC is also required to obtain approvals from the Ministry of
Water Resources, 152 Ministry of Electricity, 153 Ministry of Defense,
Ministry of Interior, 154 Ministry of Finance, 155 Ministry of Construction
and Housing, 156 Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Tourism and
Antiquities, 157 and Customs and Free Zones Authority before any
investment license can be issued.
Considering the inherent red tape and delays, obtaining approvals
from the aforementioned departments inevitably leads to significantly
delayed efforts by the NIC, especially because of the political disputes
between the NIC and the political "references" of such ministries and
bodies.

C. Financial Markets
Any outdated legislation that regulates companies operating in the
Iraqi financial market must be amended to catch up with the new Iraqi
economic trend toward a market economy and to keep up with the

151. Abbas al-Yasiri, Corruption in the Form of Bureaucracy: The Investment Projects
as a Case Study, 79 J. KUFA U. 352 (2013) (Iraq).
152. Iraq is an agricultural country wherein the rivers Euphrates and Tigris flow in
addition to many creeks and water bodies that irrigate vast agro lands. Therefore, the NIC
must obtain the approval of the Ministry of Water Resources and the Ministry of Agriculture
to ensure that there is no conflict between an investment and public or private rights on the
site proposed for such investment. See Abbas, supra note 130.
153. Iraq has an electricity grid that encompasses almost every part of the country.
Considering the severe power shortage, the Government has prioritized projects of the
Ministry of Electricity. For its part, the NIC is committed to non-conflict with grid lines or
the projects of the Ministry of Electricity. See Mahmoud, supra note 148.
154. Since 2003, Iraq has faced a wave of terrorism and instability causing change in
heavy security forces across Iraqi cities. Therefore, it is the NIC's duty to avoid issuing an
investment license unless approvals of security institutions are obtained first. See alMusawi, supra note 129.
155. The Ministry of Finance is the body entrusted with allocating government-owned
lands. Id. Therefore, it holds the power to allot a piece of land to the NIC. See id.
156. The Ministry of Housing exerts enormous efforts to build housing communities in
a large number of governorates and on vast sites under a long-term plan to build five million
housing units. Id. Accordingly, the Ministry of Housing must be contacted to ensure nonconflict with NIC projects. See id.
157. Iraq has been home to the civilizations of Babylon, Assyria, Sumer, and Akkad in
addition to the Islamic civilization. Mahmoud, supra note 148. Because of this, monuments
are almost ubiquitous, and excavation efforts for artifacts of these prior civilizations are
underway in many sites. This has caused the NIC's commitment to not introducing
investment projects that may be harmful to archeological sites. See id.
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legislation regulating international financial markets. 158 A lack of legal
protection takes away the confidence of Iraqi and foreign investors and
capital owners and holds them back from operating effectively in such a
market. Furthermore, this market suffers from weak monitoring tools
and measures, which secures minimum disclosure and transparency for
those concerned-a fact that has given rise to companies operating in
the Iraqi market with limited finances, with the exception of banks that
are required by the Central Bank to hold a minimum capital of 250
billion Iraqi Dinars, compared to 15 billion Iraqi Dinars for money
transfer companies, 150 million Iraqi Dinars for exchange companies,
1-2 billion Iraqi Dinars for small- and medium-sized loan companies,
and 150 million Iraqi Dinars for financial investment companies. 159 In
addition, some companies have weak or limited databases, much to the
detriment of investors in terms of taking safe and quick consultative
decisions. 160 Other weaknesses include lack of flexibility in the
prevailing interest rate structure, especially with banks and insurance
companies that offer mid- and long-term loans for real estate
purposes. 161
V.

DEMONSTRATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS: IRAQ
RANKING IN INTERNATIONAL INDICATORS OF THE
INVESTMENT CLIMATE

Many international bodies and organizations provide investors and
decision makers with digital information that helps them make
investment decisions. This help takes the form of a number of indices
that clarifies the efficiency of an investment environment. 162 Statistical
studies have proven that there is a close relationship between a
country's rank on such indices and how much investment it attracts. 163
To boost the stance of this study and show how faulty governmental
reforms have proven to be obstacles to foreign investment in Iraq, the

158. See Doing Business in Iraq: A Legal Guide, CEKTIR & BASARI L. FIRM (2011 ).
159. See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Joshua D. Goodman, The Global Economic
Crisis
&
Iraq's
Future,
THE
JEWISH
PoL'Y
CENTER,
available
at
http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/966/global-economic-crisis-iraq-future/ (last visited Oct.
28, 2013).
160. Benjamin B. Brockman-Hawe, The Iraqi High Court: A Retrospective and
Prospective View, 14 TILBURG L. REV. 422 (2008).
161. THE WORLD BANK, REPUBLIC OF IRAQ: FINANCIAL SECTOR REVIEW 11(2012).
162. Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay, Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where
Should We Be Going?, 23 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1 (2008).
163. UNCTAD, supra note 5.
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following points examine Iraq's performance in the investment climate
on the basis of international indices.
A. Index of Economic Freedom
Economic freedom is one of the most important investmentattracting factors because it constitutes the best means for reaching an
advanced level of growth and economic welfare. Economic freedom is
measured using a number of variables that seek to figure out how open
an economy is and how much the state interferes with its economy. 164
Iraq has continued to miss a position on the 2013 index because of
a lack of reliable data on economic liberalism within the country. Iraq
has been categorized among the countries with zero economic
liberalism, and a 4.9-point classification on the index during 19972001. In 2002, this classification went up to 5, which is the highest
ceiling for a total lack of economic liberalism, thus marking an
on
unmistaken situation of zero economic liberalism, a tighter
1 5
economic activities, and expansion of state or government control.
To have the pre-2003 Iraq so classified among states with zero
economic liberalism is a result that sounds pretty logical because of the
economic policies and measures adopted by the country's pre-2003
governments. This period was an era of heavy state interference with its
economy. However, in post-2003 Iraq, there has been an economic
reformist approach with a view to larger economic liberalism. However,
the steps adopted by Iraq have never been sufficiently convincing to
merrit any enhancement considered in its classification.

grip

B. Ease ofDoing Business Index
The Ease of Doing Business Index, created and updated annually
by the World Bank Group (WBG) and International Finance
Corporation (IFC), is a compound index consisting of ten subcomponents that make up the base for a business-doing environment.
This index measures how a country's laws and governmental
procedures affect its economic situation while focusing on the small164. See 2013 Index of Economic Freedom: About the Index, HERITAGE FOUND. &
WALL ST. J. (2013), available at http://www.heritage.org/index/about (last visited Oct. 30,
2013). The Heritage Foundation introduced this index in 1995 in conjunction with the Wall
Street Journal. Other bodies concerned with measuring economic freedom include the Fraser
Institute of Canada and the Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC).
165. See 2013 Index of Economic Freedom: Iraq, HERITAGE FOUND. & WALL ST. J.
(2013), available at
http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2013/countries/iraq.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
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and medium-scale enterprise sector with a view toward developing
benchmarks for measuring and comparing business environment
conditions in developed and developing countries. 166
In 2013, Iraq ranked 165 out of 185 countries on the Ease of Doing
Business Index, pushing it two ranks behind its placement in 2012. Iraq
debuted on this Index in 2005, when it ranked 114 out of 155 countries,
before moving behind to 145 out of 17 5 in 2006 and 146 in 2007 and
2008, with a persistent backward trend to 152 in 2009 and 166 in 2010
and 2011. These classifications explain the difficulties encountered by
the Iraqi investment, which is additional proof of the futility of the post2003 reforms. 167
C. Country Risk Rating

The country-based risk assessment indices include a number of
indications for investment- hosting countries that affect the flow-in of
foreign investments. These include political, economic, and financial
risks. Iraq has always been ranked low on all these indices, which is
further proof of the obstacles to investing in Iraq. The unanimous
categorization of Iraq by all these indices indicates the height of the
risks facing investments in Iraq. Country-based risk assessment indices
are issued by several specialist bodies, and the following are some of
them:
1. International Country Risk Guide

The BRS International Country Risk Guide is a monthly guide first
issued in 1980 that measures investment-related risks. 168 This guide
covers 140 countries, including Iraq, which remained among the highrisk countries untill 2012. From 2004 to 2007, Iraq was among the very
high-risk countries but moved forward to the moderate risk category in
2008, only to move back to the high-risk category from 2009 to 2012. 169
166. Ease of Doing Business and Distance to Frontier, WORLD BANK GROUP & INT'L
FIN.
CORP.
(2013),
available
at
http://www.doingbusiness.org/-/media/GIA WB/Doing%20Business/Documents/AnnualReports/English/DB 14-Chapters/DB 14-Ease-of-doing-business-and-distance-to-frontier. pdf
(last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
167. Doing Business 2013: Economy Profile: Iraq, WORLD BANK GROUP & INT'L FIN.
CORP.
(2013),
available
at
http://www.trade.gov/iraq/build/groups/pub lic/@tg_iqtf/documents/webcontent/tg_iqtf_ 003
994.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
168. International Country Risk Guide Methodology, PRS GROUP (2013), available at
http://www.prsgroup.com/PDFS/icrgmethodology.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
Iraq, PRS GROUP (2012), available at
169. Political Risk Rating:
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2. Euromoney Country Risk
This index is semiannually issued by the magazine Euromoney to
measure a country's ability to meet its foreign obligations, such as debt
service, paying for imports when due, and freedom to transfer
investment returns and capital. This index has nine sub-indices with
various weights. The greater the percentage of an index, the lower the
risk that a country would not meet its obligations. 170
In total, 185 countries are covered by this index. According to the
2012 results, Iraq belongs to the high-risk category of states. In 20042011, Iraq has been swinging between the very high-risk to high-risk
categories. 171
3. Institutional Investor Index
The Investment Corporation index has been issued semiannually
since 1998 and covers 173 countries. 172 Iraq was categorized among the
high-risk countries during 2010-2012. From 2004 to 2009, Iraq was a
very high-risk country, except for 2008 when it was a high-risk
country. 173
4. Dun & Bradstreet Index
This index measures country specific international commercial
exchange-related risks, paying attention to assessing country specific
risks that are not related to a country's ability to meet the obligations of
not only debt repayment, investment capital and returns, and payment
for imports to exporters, but also missed exportation and investment
opportunities. The index in question depends on four categories of
variables that cover political risks, macro-economic risks, external, and
commercial risks. 174 Covering 132 countries, the index has classified

http://www.prsgroup.com/FreeSampleRequest.aspx?fs=/prsgroup shoppingcart/freedata.asp
x@@ctry_id=44 (last visited Oct. l, 2013).
170. World Risk Average, EUROMONEY COUNTRY RISK (2013), available at
http://www.euromoneycountryrisk.com/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
171. Iraq's
wiki,
EUROMONEY
COUNTRY
RISK
(2014),
available
at
http://www.euromoneycountryrisk.com/Wiki/Iraq (last visited Mar.15, 2013).
172. Global
Rankings,
INSTITUTIONAL
INV.
(2013),
available
at
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Research/4 l 43/Global-Rankings.html (last visited Sep.
14, 2013).
173. Id.
174. Country Risk Subscriber Zones, Dun & BRADSTREET INDEX (2013), available at
http://www.dnbcountryrisk.com/?page=fctryriskl (last visited Sept. 25, 2013).
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Iraq among the highest risk group from 2004 to 2012. 175

5. Co/ace Index
This index measures the risks related to a country's failure to repay
its debts and highlights how corporate financial obligations are affected
by the performance of the local economy, local political conditions, and
economic relations with the outer world. Countries are classified into
two key groups: (1) Investment Class Countries A, which branches out
into four classes (Al-A4) and (2) Speculation Class Countries (B, C,
and D). According to this 164-state index, Iraq belongs to Group 2, with
a low class of D, i.e., Iraq is categorized as a high-risk country. 176 Two
of the negative results that emerges from a Co face index of 2014 are
"Ethnic and religious rivalries complicating the establishment of the
rule of law and fuelling the risk of civil war; Insecurity and institutional
weaknesses delaying reconstruction and investment". 177
D. Transparency Index
The Transparency Index was started in 1993 by Transparency
International, which defines "corruption" as "abuse of public office for
private gain." This index measures the transparency level by
determining corruption levels among public servants and politicians. 1 8
Iraq was introduced to Tl's reports in 2003. Iraq ranked 113
internationally and 16 in the Arab world, with a 2.2-point 179 index,
dropping down to 2.1 in 2004 to rank 129 internationally and 17 in the
Arab world. In 2005, the index went up to 2.2, leading Iraq to rank 137
internationally and 17 in the Arab world. Iraq dropped in 2006 and 2007
to international ranks of 160 and 178, respectively, and 17 and 16,
respectively, in the Arab world, with a 1.9-point index in 2006 and 1.4
in 2007. In 2008, the status oflraq worsened to hit 1.3, ranking 178, but
went back up in 2009, 2010, and 2011 as ranking 176, 175, and 169,
175. Country Risk:
Iraq, DUN & BRADSTREET (2013), available at
https://www.dbai.dnb.com/int/en/dbai_frame.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2013).
176. Economic
Studies:
Iraq,
COFACE
(2013),
available
at
http://www.coface.com/Economic-Studies-and-Country-Risks/Iraq (last visited Oct. 29,
2013).
177. Economic Studies: Major Macroeconomic Indicators: Iraq, COFACE (2013),
available at http://www.coface.com/Economic-Studies-and-Country-Risks/Iraq (last visited
Mar. 14, 2014).
178. Who We Are: Our history, 1993 In the beginning, TRANSPARENCY INT'L (2013),
available at http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/history (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
179. Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INT'L (2012), available at
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
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respectively, with 1.5, 1.8, and 18 points in 2012. 180
The quoted indices simply add to a distrustful investment
environment and the growing reluctance of investors to investing in Iraq
owing to lack of transparent transactions.

E. Governance Indicator
Governance Indices are issued by the World Bank Group following
the collection of respective elements from various sources. These
indices monitor governance and institutions entrusted with power in a
given country. Such monitoring includes the mechanisms of electing,
supervising, and replacing a country's government, a government's
ability to develop and enforce sound and efficient policies, and respect
from citizens and the state for institutions that govern a country's
economic and social relations. 181 The Percentile Index is adopted here to
figure out where Iraq stands among the rest of the world.
1. Regulatory Quality Index
This index develops perceptions of a government's ability to
develop and enforce sound policies and regulations that help encourage
private sector growth. 182 Iraq's ranks on this index have been 7.4/2003,
3.4/2004, 5.4 /2005, 6.9/2006, 7.3/2007, 13.1/2008, 16.7/2009, 15.8
/2010, and 12.8/2011. This is but an indication of the deteriorating and
inefficient regulatory frameworks to bring investments into Iraq. 183
2. Government Effectiveness Index
This index develops perceptions on the efficiency of public
services and civil service and the degree of independence of the latter
from political pressures. It also analyzes the sound mechanisms used for
government policy development and enforcement, as well as the
credibility of the government in terms of realizing these policies. 184 Iraq

180. Id.
181. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project, WORLD BANK GRP.,
available at http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/index.aspx#home (last visited Oct.
30, 2013).
182. Regulatory Quality, WORLD BANK GRP., available at
http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/pdf/rq. pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
183. Worldwide Governance Indicators: Iraq Index, WORLD BANK GRP. (2012),
available at http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (last visited Sept.
16, 2013) [hereinafter Iraq Index].
at
available
GRP.,
BANK
WORLD
Effectiveness,
184. Government
http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/pdf/ge.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
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has secured low ratings in this respect: 1.5\2003, 2.0\2004, 1.0\2005,
0.5\2006, 2.9\2007, 8.7\ 2008, 9.1 \2009 & 2010, 10.4\ 2011. 185
These ratings indicate the inefficiency of the Iraqi Government's
administrative performance. This is no surprise considering the
conditions of the Baath Government till its toppling by the Coalition
Forces in 2003. Despite the little improvements made since 2007, the
ratings remain below the investors' expectations.
3. Index ofPolitical Stability and Absence of Violence
This index measures the perceptions of potential instability, such
as potential government instability or toppling by unconstitutional
means, and violent cases with political and terroristic motives. 186
Iraq had very low ratings from 2003 to 2011: 0.5/2003, 0.0/2004,
0.5/2005, 0.0/2006, 0.5/2007, 1.4/2008, 2.4/2009, 1.9/2010, 3.8/2011. 187
These ratings reveal the country's unstable political situation and higher
waves of violence and terrorism. Therefore, efforts must be exerted to
alleviate political rifts and enshrine national interests for a better
political reality, which is currently experiencing moderate improvement.
4. Rule of Law Index
This index evaluates the confidence of the parties working with the
state in terms of the latter's commitment to sound legal practices as per
the rule of law principle, especially as it relates to contract enforcement,
property rights, police, and courts, while ensuring such parties have
necessary protection against arbitrary orders or decisions in individual
cases. 188 Iraq ranked low on this index between 2003 to 2011: 2.9/2003,
0.5/2004 & 2005, 1.0/2006 to 2008, 1.4/2009, 1.9/2010, and
2.3/2011. 189 These figures prove the lack of state prestige and omission
on the part of public authorities to enforce applicable laws with equality
and observation of realities in Iraq. Therefore, foreign investors may be
dubious about the efficiency and enforceability of legal rules and
regulations in the countries they intend to invest.
In a nutshell, and as suggested by these indices, the investment
185. Iraq Index, supra note 183.
186. Political Stability and the Absence of Violence/Terrorism, WORLD BANK GRP.,
available at http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/pdf/pv.pdf (last visited Sept. 25,
2013).
187. Iraq Index, supra note 183.
188. Rule of Law, WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS, available at
http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/pdf/rl.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
189. Iraq Index, supra note 183.
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environment in Iraq has consistently secured low rating despite
moderate improvement in some of these rankings during different
periods. However, improvements have not been made to the extent that
enables the recovery of Iraqi investment environment. In contrast, Iraq
still lacks a sound, healthy, and competitive environment, which would
attract foreign investors. Therefore, a clear investment promotion
strategy coupled with boosting the recent approaches adopted over the
years that have shown the best index ratings for Iraq must be adopted.
VI.

ROADMAP: RECOMMENDATIONS THAT SHOULD
BE ADOPTED
There is no "silver bullet" for foreign investor aversion to Iraq.
Nevertheless, there are certain reforms that may well alleviate foreign
investors' concerns and establish a sustainable investment friendly
environment.
The general reform framework is all about introducing
constitutional amendments, combating terror under a rule-of-law
approach adopted by a strong and transparent (both centrally and
locally) government, and introducing incentive and guarantee-based
pro-foreign investment legislation.
A. Address Inherent Determinants

By showing that the Iraqi Government's strategy did not
effectively address these challenges, this subsection highlights the
importance of creating a safe environment for foreign investors and
dealing with the risks encountered by these investors Iraq by addressing
the country's security and political challenges, need for institutional
reform by governance, and modernization of investment environment
laws.
1. Constitutional Revision
Constitutional revision of power distribution between the central
government and Kurdistan Province on one hand and the central
government and other non-provincial governorates on the other 190 is the
190. The Iraqi Constitution adopted a federal system for dealing with the Kurdistan
Province. Sabah Al-Bawi, Influences of Ambiguity of Constitutional Provisions on the
Administrative System of Iraq, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1165, 1165 (2012). This system applies
decentralized administration when it comes to the central government non-provincial
govemorate relationship. Id. Constitutional provisions are so unclear that several disputes
erupted across various fields, casting shadows on foreign investment companies. Id.
Furthermore, foreign investments that entered into oil contracts with the Kurdistan Province
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starting point for constitutional reform. Despite the current
decentralized administration of govemorates, the current administrative
structures adopt an unsteady approach toward Kurdistan, but a strong
approach toward other govemorates. Federalism and decentralized
administration have not been enforced effectively in the modem sense
of the concept, while public govemorate-based directories are nothing
short of "seconded" circuits of various centralized ministries. 191
A reformist paper about the decentralization policy must address
the administrative and structural organization at the province level, in
the Kurdistan Province, in non-provincial govemorates, roles and
responsibilities at each level, mobilization and allocation of resources,
institutional development, and capacity building. A reformist paper
must be based on a comprehensive survey of all existing laws and
practices that could be developed through consultative measures
adopted in conjunction with the concerned parties.
The conflict of federal, provincial, and govemorate laws that are
not clearly regulated by the Constitution is a major obstacle to foreign
investments in Iraq. Therefore, amending Article 115 of the Iraqi
Constitution 192 is a key issue because the Article prioritizes the Province
Law in reference to the distribution of powers in the event of a dispute
with the federal government. In contrast, other specific Articles refer to
the federal law as the dominating law when applied to cases of dispute
between provincial or govemorate laws. Surely, this trend is compatible
with sound legal logic.
The other suggestion is amending Article 122.5 of the Iraqi
Constitution, which allows Provincial Councils to disobey the laws of
the central legislature. Paragraph 2 of this Article gives govemorates
large administrative and financial powers, but relevant laws do not
identify such large powers. Accordingly, the provision results in a
dispute between the central government, which is annoyed by the
concept of powers, and the govemorates, which demand an expanding
have been penalized by the Iraqi Federal Government, which deems any contract it does not
control as invalid. See id.
191. See Michael J. Kelly, The Kurdish Regional Constitution Within the Framework
of the Iraqi Federal Constitution: A Struggle for Sovereignty, Oil, Ethnic Identity, and the
Prospects for a Reverse Supremacy Clause, 114 PENN ST. L. REV . 707 (2010).
192. See Article 115, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic
of Iraq] of 2005, which reads: "All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the
federal government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not
organized in a region. With regard to other powers shared between the federal government
and the regional government, priority shall be given to the law of the regions and
governorates not organized in a region in case of dispute."
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interpretation. 193
Such disputes and conflicts have been a stumbling block to
establishing a healthy foreign investment environment, even leading
foreign investors to lose confidence in Iraqi laws. Penalties have been
imposed on foreign companies owing to their agreements with
Kurdistan without the consent of the federal government. These
penalties have caused a hostile atmosphere between provincial councils
and Kurdistan on one hand and the central ministries on the other.
Establishing a successful system for the distribution of wealth in
Iraq requires a clear interpretation of Articles 111 and 112 of the Iraqi
Constitution 194 up to enactment of the Oil & Gas Law. As a consequent
step, the central government is required to develop and enforce
transparency and accountability systems that ensure a better exploitation
of resources out of decentralization; otherwise, state-driven anti-redtape efforts will grow more costly, with more chances for wider-scale
corruption. The central government can play a key role in formulating
public policies to attract investors, controlling the public, evaluating
institutions that are in direct contact with investors, and supervising the
decentralized opportunities available for investment.
Promoting a pro-foreign-investment culture in local, closed
communities is an essential effort that must involve better legal
awareness of foreign properties. The federal government can contribute
to the benefits of foreign investments. Furthermore, the social role of
the government and civil society organizations may be evident in
managing the means of contact with foreign investors and local
communities to break the psychological barriers that form a part of the
legacy of the colonization era further awakened by the 2003 occupation
oflraq.

2. Strengthening Anti-Terrorism Efforts
Boosting security stability is a key cornerstone to building an
investment attracting environment. As far as decade long terrorism
stricken Iraq is concerned, efforts of combating terrorism require the
following:
193. Al-Bawi, supra note 190, at 1167.
194. The Government of the Kurdistan Province insists on the "existing field" phrase
in Article 112, which provides for the control of oil and gas matters by the oil-producing
provincial and governorate governments. This means that newly discovered fields will be
controlled directly by the relevant province and/or governorate. The Central Government, in
turn, insists on Article 111 of the Constitution, which reads, "Oil and gas are owned by all
the people oflraq in all the regions and govemorates." See id. at 1168.
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a. Combating Terrorism Financing
The government should consider adopting new legislation on
confiscation of assets, money-laundering, and combating terrorism
financing with a view to allowing more room for law enforcement that
hinders financing terrorism and organized crime.
b. Fighting Terrorism According to the Rule ofLaw
Iraq's anti-terrorism efforts should move ahead while focusing on
the rule of law by litigating imprisoned terrorists using the applicable
Iraqi laws. The government should ensure joint responsibility of all
bodies concerned with enforcing applicable laws while moving ahead
with the capacity building of key government bodies and officials to
combat terror and international organized crime per existing laws.
Furthermore, the government is required to work with the international
community to update the laws and tools used to stand against fastgrowing criminal and terrorist networks.
It is essential to exert tremendous effort to enforce court orders and
judgments and step up cooperation between the judiciary and Judgment
Enforcement Office of the Ministries of Justice and Interior. The
unending prison breaks by terrorism condemned inmates must be
stopped. Government officials should honor final judgments through
improved administrative and criminal mechanisms.
c. Cooperating Widely in Counter-Terrorism Efforts
The government should expand its cooperative efforts across its
federal, provincial, and local system of government to combat terrorism,
whether Iraq-based or otherwise. Careful exchanges of information
between several government bodies, along with ensuring joint but
carefully distributed roles and procedures between local anti-terrorism
departments and all federal security agencies is the best means of
combating major threats.
3. Combating Corruption Flu
Several agencies such as the Commission of Integrity, 195 the
195. A key anti-corruption body was established by Decree No. 55 of 2004, which was
issued by the Interim Coalition Authority. About CO!, COMM'N OF INTEGRITY, available at
http://www.nazaha.iq/en_news2.asp?page_namper=e2 (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). A key
distinctive feature of this body is its independence from governmental and parliamentary
supervision. Id. The body was established to enforce the country's anti-corruption laws,
public service standards, and conduct social awareness campaigns that add to stronger
demands for transparent and accountable, clean leadership. Id.
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Inspector General, 196 and the Board of Supreme Audit 197 assume the
burden of combating corruption in Iraq. The growing corruption rates in
Iraq are due to the double-control, balance, and law enforcement
standards, with actions of the judiciary and parliamentary powers also
being in a similar position. All the abovementioned bodies have been
pressured to achieve certain results and have hence caused damage to
the overall anti-corruption system. There are key procedures that should
be established by the government for effectively combating corruption.

a. Strengthening Anti-Corruption Institutions
Effective leadership for any agency or organization is determined
by the employment authority. In Iraq, integrity bodies still need to boost
the appointment of Commission of Integrity employees and public
inspectors by the House of Representatives, as provided for in relevant
law, by moving away from the political quota-based trend. Filling future
vacancies by means of the random choice of public inspectors by
supervising bodies (such as the best employees of the Board of Supreme
Audit) would be a means of ensuring fair appointments. The same
applies to the Central Bank of Iraq and Office for Reporting Money
Laundering. Moreover, procedures and measures requmng
determination of beneficiary owners to prevent and disclose transfers of
criminal revenues should be legislatively endorsed. 198 Furthermore,
there is an urgent need to activate and build the capacities of the Office
for Reporting Money Laundering of the Central Bank of Iraq and
develop new systems to settle conflicts of interest between the integrity
officers.
b. Improving Accountability
Better accountability practices require the adoption of a group of
measures, such as annual submission of financial statements to the
Board of Supreme Audit and House of Representatives, regulating
196. This office was established by Decree No. 57 of 2004. MINISTRY OF OIL,
available at http://www.oil.gov.iq/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). It is charged with
conducting reviews and audits of and investigations into ministerial works to check for any
abuses of power and violations of laws governing public service. Id.
197. The oldest controlling institution as it dates back to 1927 as per Law No. 17.
Board's Law, Bo. OF SUP. AUDIT (2013), available at http://www.d-raqabam.iq/pages_en/about_law_e.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). Formerly the Public Audit
Office, it aims at conducting financial auditing to check corruption, fraud, and misuse of
public funds for the purposes of disbursement and use. Id.
197 United Nations Convention against Corruptoin art. 52, Oct. 31, 2003, U.N. Doc.
A/58/422.
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disclosures of income and ensuring submission to the Commission of
Integrity, including capacity building to use such disclosures to expose
corruption, and developing integrity, accountability, and control
capacities of parliament members and governorate board members,
particularly in major fields such as oil and gas, public finance, public
expenditure constraints, corruption, and law enforcement. Similarly, the
containment of political influence to weaken the control and influence
of government employees is required. Financing political parties and
disclosure of sources thereof should be regulated. The enforcement of
effective anti-corruption measures at supreme levels (including
imprisonment sentences commensurate with relevant crimes),
prevention of criminal revenues from falling into the hands of corrupt
persons, and development and enforcement of long-term capacitybuilding programs for combating the corrupt practices of government
officials at all levels of civil service are required. In addition,
government capacity should be enhanced to combat corruption and
nepotism through the promotion of a professional civil service that
adopts transparent policies of human resources management, including
the existing efficiency-based systems and clarifying the role of the
applicable Code of Conduct. Iraq needs sustained assistance to establish
an anti-money-laundering system in order to detect, investigate, freeze,
confiscate, and return lost assets and to immediately boost initial legal
cooperation with neighboring countries and countries further from its
borders. Other steps include combating money laundering by enacting
appropriate legislation, supporting strong capacity building efforts for
the Office for Reporting Money Laundering, and establishing a
monetary intelligence unit with the Central Bank of Iraq under strong
and independent leadership. These steps should be followed by a list of
public officials to be monitored and developed in this respect. Finally,
control, monitoring, and supervisory bodies need a better level of intercoordination, especially between the Board of Supreme Audit and
Commission of Integrity.

c. Complying With International Commitments
Despite approving the United Nations Convention against
Corruption by virtue of Law No. 35 of 2007, Iraqi legislators are
required to adopt all necessary measures to ensure effective
enforcement of the said Convention and observe the provisions thereof
in all laws enacted thereby. To achieve this goal, it is time to approve
Article 12 of the Convention, which regulates mechanisms of control,
supervision, and accountability adopted by the State in cooperation with
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the private sector. Furthermore, working on harmonizing internal codes
of conduct for public servants and internationally and regionally
approved rules is a must. Other measures Iraq needs to undertake
include international cooperation to combat money laundering crimes
and coordinate efforts for the same, approval of the principle of
exchangeable international judicial assistance and international
cooperation in criminal and civil fields, and confiscation of corruptiongenerated revenues and returning the same to the country of origin.
Finally, electronic means for detecting and following up on corruption
and cross-border corruption-generated revenues must be implemented.
4. Rehabilitation ofInfrastructure
The Iraqi Government should take up achieving good economic
growth ratings as a key priority, an endeavor that requires a
comprehensive and advanced program to develop and enhance the
existing infrastructure. The major challenge to this program is the
electricity sector because securing current and future electricity needs
by the most cost-efficient means is inevitable to push forward the
country's economic growth and reduce production costs.
To upgrade the infrastructure in Iraq, the government should
establish a supreme council for the reconstruction of infrastructure with
the mission of planning, overseeing, and coordinating efforts of the
concerned ministries in accordance with an explicit future vision. The
proposed council needs specialist management in the field of
infrastructure and economy. Further, the Iraqi infrastructure database
should have complete and continuously up-to-date data. In addition,
there must be a specialist bank concerned primarily with financing
various infrastructure projects for low interest rate loans while seeking
to manage such loans in a manner that secures necessary liquidity for
infrastructure service projects without compromising the development
of such services on the grounds of lack of necessary liquidity.
Meanwhile, there must be deliberate and constant endeavors to
encourage infrastructure-based investments in accordance with modem
finance schemes such as concession and management contracts, which
secure private sector involvement by realizing double digit return
ratings in return for provision of quality services and maintenance for
such projects. Unequivocally, this requires a competitive approach,
private sector involvement, fewer restrictions to these markets, and
regulation of the same as per market economy rules.
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B. Reform of the Legal Framework
The purpose of this subsection is to seek the relevant benefits and
offer them in the form of a "guiding manual" for the Iraqi Government
for use in order to handle its investment-environment problems, mainly
by amending and modernizing investment environment laws.
1. Activation ofProtection ofIntellectual Property
At the center of the reform efforts is the establishment of effective
institutions to deter violations against intellectual property rights, which
should begin in conjunction with the launch of a public awareness
campaign to respect these rights. In a related development, unifying the
rules of property rights scattered in several laws under a single law is
also necessary. Likewise, legal wording contained in the legislation of
property rights should be clear and not allow for more than one
interpretation. Additionally, the country's intellectual property laws
should be identical to the provisions of the TRIPS agreement. These
reforms as well as their role in the protection of intellectual property
will lead to the acceleration oflraq's accession to the WTO.
2. Enforcement ofInternational Arbitration Awards
The Iraqi Investment Law allows for national arbitration as per
Iraqi laws or international arbitration through referral to any
internationally recognized arbitration body, as provided for under
Article 27/4. 199 However, this Article is inconsistent with provisions of
the Law on Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Iraq No. 30 of 1928
because it does not include any provision for enforcing foreign
arbitration judgments in Iraq. Furthermore, Article 1 of the aforesaid
law requires that for a foreign judgment to be enforced in Iraq, it needs
to be issued by a foreign competent court formed outside Iraq. 200
As long as there is no law allowing for the enforcement of foreign
judgments, Article 27/4 of the Iraqi Investment Law is futile. This is
further complicated by the fact that Iraq is not a party to international
conventions on arbitration. Consequently, as a procedural guarantee for
settlement of investment disputes, efficient arbitration is up to standard

199. National
Investment Law [NIL]
art.
27 (2007),
available at
http://trade.gov/static/iraq_investmentlaw.pdf. "If one of the parties to a dispute is subject
to the provisions of this law, they may, at the time of signing the agreement, agree on a
mechanism to resolve disputes including arbitration pursuant to the Iraqi law or any other
internationally recognized entity." Id.
200. Haddad, supra note 104.
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in Iraqi legislation. Therefore, this paper proposes amendment of Law
No. 30 on Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Iraq of 1928 in order to
provide for enforcement of arbitration judgments as per the terms and
conditions required thereof.
The above analysis clarifies that the enforcement mechanism of
foreign arbitration decisions has terminated all efforts exerted to
identify or develop effective settlement mechanisms for foreign
investment disputes in Iraq. Therefore, signing the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York
1958, has become inevitable because arbitration clauses in foreign
contracts require enforcement of arbitration awards. This shall become a
reality only by joining the said Convention, entering into bilateral
international agreements, or enactment of a new Iraqi arbitration law.
3. Promote Judiciary Independence and Capabilities
Iraqi courts are key players in investment dispute settlements.
Accordingly, it is imperative for the courts to have the power to deal
with foreign investment contracts. This shall be a key milestone to back
up upgrading capacities and establishing judicial independence and
security.
a. Boosting Judicial Independence
In seeking an independent judiciary, there is a dire need to provide
a sufficient number of judges and judicial courts to boost the course of
civil and commercial proceedings. Through judicial education and
capacity building, the SJC will be able to maintain high professional
standards for new judges. The much sought after independent judicial
system can be shielded from political influence by enforcing laws that
provide immunity to the judiciary. In addition, a relevant suggestion is
making more information and statistics regarding cases available to the
general public in order to spread awareness on legal culture and judicial
transparency.
b. Upgrading Judicial Capacities
Judicial newcomers' capacities must be built alongside efforts to
educate current judges through systemic training, continuous learning,
and updating relevant curricula. The Judicial Development Institute
assumes a key role in such continuous learning efforts. Long-term
activities can be technologically updated along with state-of-the-art
means of reviewing and presenting cases. Advanced training for the
judiciary in commercial and civil laws, as well as effective use of the
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commercial structure of cases and handing down judgments are among
areas of desired development. Additionally, commercial and civil legal
proceedings must be upgraded to promote a scientific and technical
court environment. Systemic reviews and continuous improvements in
enforcement of judgments (especially foreign arbitration judgments)
and court orders will contribute to better judicial capacities.

c. Enhancing Judicial Security
Judicial reforms in Iraq require short-term consideration of the
joint responsibility of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) and the
Ministry of Interior (MoI) for judicial security. This objective is
attainable via a judicial security place clarifying the Mol's or SJC's
responsibility for judicial security. This plan shall cover details of
personal security, court security, and safe and secure houses for judges.

C. Reorganization of the Investment Framework
This measure aims to determine rehabilitation mechanisms of the
investment framework-an objective achievable by discussing available
solutions and recommending rectification of defects in the overall
investment process.

1. Activating the Role ofInvestment Commissions
The key suggestion for a reformist plan starts with the initiation of
a comprehensive scheme concerning the Law of Civil Service and
Public Administration. This scheme should enhance the links between
civil service and administrative reforms, enhance public finance
management, and build provincial capacities to provide non-central
services.
Reforms of the Law of Civil Service should adopt the key values
of modem management, namely efficiency-based appointments;
performance assessments and evaluations; successful planning; role
determination; delineation of responsibilities and relationships between
civil servants, ministers, and other elected officials; and codification of
ethical values and standards for the benefit of the society. In addition,
there is a need to establish secondary legislation to strengthen the civil
service compliance framework and links between civil service and
administrative reforms.
In a nutshell, Iraq needs to establish integrated e-govemance to
wipe out forms of financial and administrative corruption and provide
services (absent red tape) to investors through state-of-the-art e-portals
across public institutions.

Published by SURFACE, 2013

51

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 5

196

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 41: 1

This study suggests entrusting the Ministry of Finance with
obtaining approvals from the ministries and government bodies in the
course of any potential investments. This is because the Ministry of
Finance owns all public lands that are not allotted to other ministries or
bodies. Thus, the Ministry of Finance is supposedly responsible for the
determination of all land available for investments, contacting other
ministries to ensure that these are free of current or proposed activities
by such ministries, and establishing the viability of introducing
investments thereto. This suggestion ensures full knowledge and
determination of the lots available for investment and thus enhances
investment planning and promotion. Another benefit is minimizing the
red tape associated with obtaining a host of ministerial approvals.
2. Removal ofBureaucratic Obstacles
For addressing institutional obstacles, it is hereby suggested to
introduce a "Liaison Department" to serve as a linking point between
the NIC and other ministries and bodies concerned, for better
understanding and coordination. The suggested structure of such
Liaison Department is based on assigning the management thereof to
the NIC, with deputy ministers accounting for other members.
Ministries that are directly concerned, such as the Ministries of Finance,
Planning, Housing and Construction, and Industry, should be introduced
as members of the suggested Department along with other members
belonging to the ministries and bodies as needed in a manner
commensurate with their roles in support investment projects.
3. Developing the Iraqi Financial Market
There are a number of key recommendations to enhance the Iraqi
financial market, the most significant among which is increasing
cooperation opportunities between Iraqi financial market components in
terms of their respective services and amending the existing financial
and banking legislations that regulate and control operations of nonbanking economic institutions to ensure compatibility with marketdriven economy requirements, develop performance among such
institutions, use e-systems to run their work, and ensure sufficient legal
guarantees to win investors' trust. Relevantly, an extensive durable
database must be created for public entities in the Iraqi financial market
to enable decision makers to make objective decisions regarding entities
working therein. Another key step is providing a non-banking financial
entity friendly investment climate by encouraging the creation of
market-making compames, investment guarantors, and finance
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companies, including small and medium loan companies. Further, banks
and companies must be encouraged to issue bonds allowed under
Companies Law No. 21 of 1997, as doing so is a key tool to increasing
capital and developing investment awareness of good revenues.
Working on developing clear mechanisms and directives to transform
the central Iraqi economy to a market-driven economy adds up to taking
the aforementioned steps. These actions would help dispel the
ambiguities, difficulties, and gaps posed by such transformation during
the transitional period.
VII.
CONCLUSION
In today's critical stage of Iraq's modem history, efforts to attract
foreign investors are underway. Foreign investors have always been
reluctant to break into this harsh investment environment given its
particularities, such as the military force driven transformation from a
dictatorship to a democracy and the transformation from a socialist to a
liberal system of government. This has resulted in Iraq's inability to
apply democratic ways of government and its fragile relationship with
liberalism, which hinders its financial and economic openness with the
rest of the world widely. Further, the current socialist laws of commerce
and economy are still in force alongside new liberal laws, thus leading
to a conflict between laws meant to regulate the same aspects of an
action.
Analytically speaking, this article has revealed the seriousness of
the risks of investing in Iraq to foreign investors. In addition, this article
spots the key obstacles in the Iraqi investment environment and
provides suggestions for Iraqi legislators and government for the
development and enhancement the investment environment. This
conclusion requires further legislation tantamount to the International
Investment Law in addition to ratification of relevant international
conventions and consideration of the conclusion of more bilateral
investment agreements; these measures would send positive messages
about the seriousness of the incentives and legal guarantees for foreign
investments in Iraq. Equally important is an appropriate consideration
of the challenges being faced by the concerned investment authorities
and public service bodies, as these may affect the efforts to enhance
Iraq's worldwide rank in foreign investment. To a large extent, codes of
shielding investment authorities against political influences should be
adopted. Meanwhile, initiatives developed by investment authorities to
attract foreign investors must be provided with political support.
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